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CHAPTER I 
1945: JAPANESE ARMY SURRENDER EXPLODES CHINESE 
NATIONALIST ANTI COMMUNIST P.ARTY ARMIES 
The formal surrender of the Japanese on the deck of 
the U. s. Battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, Japan, on 
September 2, 1945, was the signal for the Na tional 
Government Forces and the Communist Party Forces in 
China to expand and grab territory with great vigor and 
resource. 1 
On order of the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers 
i n Tokyo, the Chinese National Republic of Generalissimo 
Chiang Ka i Shek was designated as the a en t of the .Al lies 
to t ake over the surrender of the Japanese and the 
Japanese Controlled Forces on the Chinese Mainland.2 
The Japanese Commanders carried out their orders with 
precision and det ail . 
.A t the same time, General Chu Teh - the Commander in 
Chief of the Communist Party Armies, whose he ad quarte~s was 
---------------
1
"Move in North China," The Times (London) , 
August 21, 1945, P • 4. 
2F. c. Jones, Hugh Borton, and B. R. Fearn, The Far 
East 1242-1247, (New York: Oxford University Press, 195)) 
p. 499. 
l 
2 
located in Yenan, Shansi Province - ordered the Jap anese 
to turn over their arms and equipment to the Commu.nist 
Forces. 3 This order was issu.ed because it was a part 
of Chinese Communist strategy in 1945 to secure all the 
military supplies possible in order to increase their 
strength against the day when they would challenge Chiang 
Kai Shek for supremacy in China. As early as .1939 in 
his book, 'tMy Country and My Peo ple", Lin Yutang had 
suggested that the future of China would be resolved 
between these two opp osing forces. He says: "The in-
ternal political system of China will take a middle 
road fought out between the Kuomi ng tang and the Chinese 
Communist Party, or between Chiang Kai She k and the Eighth 
4 Route Army, Generals Chu Teh and Mao Tse Tung." In 
spite of General Chu Teh' s order, the Japanese would not 
and did not turn over their arms to the Chinese Communists. 
Teams of United States Army officers were designated 
as observers to witness the surrender of J apanese military 
e quipment to Chinese Nationalist Forces. These were dis-
patched from Kunming and Chungkirtg to all areas occupied 
b5r the Japanese Anny on the mainland of China with the 
exception of uni ts in Mancil uria and the Russian sphere 
of action. Colonel W. C. Wilson was one of the u. s. 
3Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach, Modern Far 
Eastern International Relations, (New York: TI. Van 
Nostrand Company, fnc., 1950T, p. 637. 
4Lin Yutang, Ml Countrl and Ml Peo~l~, New York: 
The John Day Company, Inc., 19)9, p. 41. 
Army officers del ega ted to witness the surrender of 
the 12th Japanese Arm.sr Group at Chenghs hi en, Honan 
5 Provinc e , on Sep tember 9, 1945. The Chinese Commander 
of the First War Zone, General Hu Tsu Nan, was the com-
mander disar ming the Japanese Armies in the a rea of 
Chenghshien on the Yellow River. 6 This city some times 
referred to a s Chengchow, is in Honan Province and is 
3 
the junction of the Lungha i and Peiping- Hankow Railroads. 
The surrender was effected in a ceremony which took place 
in a p leas an t courtyard of a l arge Chinese administra tors 
home. The Japanese Command er in Chief presented his sword 
to General Hu Tsu Nan and his Chi e f of S taff presented a 
listing of the officers, men, ri f les, guns, and i mpedi-
menta to General HU 's representative. General Hu and his 
officers were so happy and excited over the turn of events 
wh ich had suddenly caused the J ap anese Army to give up , 
that t h ey could not cont ain t hemselves. 
After the ceremony, a second meeting was held with 
the Japanese General and his staf f of ficers 7 and the u. s . 
Anny Team in wh ich duplic a te lists of of ficers, men, and 
milita ry e quipment wer e given to t he U. s . Army officer 
witnesses. The General e xp lained to them t ha t his army 
had lived and maintained itself in the area fo r more than 
---------------
5Private papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, Sep tember 9, 1945. 
6
"Chinese Troops Continue t o Disarm J aps:' . The 
Chungking Re2or ter, Vol. I I , No. 27, Sep tember 6--;'""T945. 
7search in files of Chi ef of U. S . Mi l it ary History 
f a ils to r e veal name of J ap anese General. 
a year. He announced t hat he did not unders tand why his 
nation was surrendering to China . He pointed out that 
he an::l his men and units performed a very great service 
because they provided _peace and protection for a ll the 
ci ti zens to carry out t heir norma l pursuits. On his wall 
maps he showed t he Ame rican officers where g uerilla 
activities were centered and stated t ha t guerillas oc-
cupied a ll the country excep t the railroa ds and well 
travelled roads. 8 
4 
His words proved to be true. Wit hin Twenty-four 
hours after his troops marc hed aw ay from the Railroad 
S t a tions, the Civic Buildings, t he food warehouses, and 
distribution centers, pandemonium reigned. The pre vi ously 
orderly streets were a scene of confusion. Some shop-
kee pers closed and boarded their pla ces of busine s s . 
Crowds of country peopl e roamed wi t hout di rec ti on. Gro ups 
of soldi ers engaged i n altercations with civilians. 
Em rgency policemen made no attemp t to direct traffic 
an::1 keep the peace. 
After a day of such discord General Hu sent a 
messenger for Colone 1 James O. "fade, 9 t he senior of'fic er 
of the u. S . Army delegation that was t aking part in the 
surrender, and asked him to a ct a s a mediator with the 
---------------
8 Private papers, Colonel V/ilson, Sep tember 9, 1945. 
9rnterview with Colonel J ame s O. Wade, September 11, 
1945. 
Japanese General. He specifically wan ted an immediate 
audienc e with th e Japanese General. It was arranged in 
5 
a short time and that afternoon the Chinese , the Ame r i cans 
and the Japanese met in t he dimly lighted room tha t the 
Japanese General used as a sititing room in his Head quarters 
at Chenghsien. General Hu was agitated and upset. "I 
want you to lend me your forces to protect the property 
of the citizens and the National Government, 0 he said. 
The Japanese General was businessllie and polite. 
0 0f course," he replied. "I' 11 do anything you des ire. 
My men are not very busy. We have put t h em to p l an ting 
gardens because we do not know how long t hey will be 
here.nlO 
General Hu then explained to the group tha t the 
bandits in the outlying areas, the normal cutthroats, 
robbers and thugs in the city were not the real trouble, 
but that his own, the Chinese Division Commanders , were 
not controlling their men. The 19th Army had been given 
one area in the city and the 23rd Army had been given the 
ad jacent area. 1lhen the troops of both c ame to a ware-
house with particularly valuable property, they took it 
over for their own generals and a pitched battle ensued 
which was as deadly as any engaged in during the past war. 
The Japanese General outlined t ha t he would put guards on 
the areas who would r espect t he boundaries of the City as 
lOibid. 
General Hu Tsu Nan prescribed them. General Hu gave up a 
map which showed the necessary information and the con-
ference was over. 
The next ti.a:e that one of the .American observers 
passed one of the indicated warehouses, everyth ing was 
11 quiet and peaceful. Two sturdy, completely armed 
Chinese soldiers were marching back and forth. Each 
was armed with a Light Machine Gun and a magazine of 45 
caliber shells inserted in the magazine. In addition, 
both had two German type potato masher grenades strapped 
to their chests. From the straw s andals on their feet to 
6 
the cotton cap with the blue and white star of the 
Kuoming tang on it, they looked the part of military sentries. 
But tbe real ma ster of the situation was a small squat 
fig ur e in a light cotton sleeveless shirt and cotton shorts. 
The J ap anese soldier cap bore no insignia and the man was 
bare handed. He was there and that was all t ha t was 
needed to preserve order. 
In a few days the .American team flew back to Kunmingl2 
and the Head quarter s of the Chinese Combat Comm.and, from 
whence they had come. The .American Anny was wi thdrawing 
fro m Western China as fast as planes could car ry them 
back over the Hump to India or trucks could haul them 
11
nJapanese Forces Dis armed, Order Restored;t , The 
Chungking ReQorter, Vol II No~ 29, Sep tember 20, 19457 
12Private pape~s, Colonel VT . C. Wilson, September 
15, 1945. 
7 
back over t he S tilwell Road, enroute to Ca lcutta and 
t hence to the United States. 
All o:f t he officers, .men, and ecuipment in Western 
China were not sent ba ck to the United States in t his 
me.m.orable :fall of 1945. A few 1'.1 ere diverted to Sbanghai 
on orders of General Albert c. Wedeme~r,, China Theater 
Commander. There t hey were put to work supervising the 
movement of other U. S. soldier s , officers, and records, 
back to the United Sta tes; a nd they assisted t he movement 
o:f Na tionalist Chinese Ar.mies into South and Central 
China. 13 Those AID:1ricans detained , had no inkling of the 
unusua l events which they were soon go ing to be called 
upon to take par t in. For the present they busied t hem.-
selves with numerous activities in Shanghai, which arose 
because of the c ha ngeover from. the J ap anese occupation, 
the e va cuation and repatriation of the J apanese, and the 
taking over of sovereignty by the Republic of China Forces. 
Speculations of the officers and men remaining in 
Shanghai ranged from. topics such as praise for t he Eig hth 
Route Army in Shansi Province, or the training Stilwell's 
Command gave the Kuomingtang New Sixth Anny at Ra.m.gahr, 
India; and how soon they would bring their wives and 
families to China to take up a sort of occupation duty 
which did not appear to be too arduous. These speculations 
13u.s. 
Blrnes, for 
'2". 
Depart.m.ent of State, Memorandum. by Secretar~ 
the War De pa rt.m.ent, Decemoer 9, 1945, Appen ix 
were heightened on December 20 by the appearance of 
General George Catlett Wtarshall at the entrance of the 
China Theater Command, in company with General Wedem~y~r 
at Shanghai. 14 
General George c. Marshall arrived on Chinese soil 
and directed the lives and activities oi' part oi' the U.S. 
Military Forces in China as the Special Representative of 
President Harry S. Truman wit h the rank of an .Ambassador. 
He wa s appointed on November 27, 1945, 15 and served in 
this capacity until he le ft China on his nomination to be 
Secretary of State of the United States on January 7, 
1947. This appointment of Gen eral Marshall to China 
filled the va cancy created by the resignation of General 
Patrick J. Hurley as personal representative of President 
Roosevelt to China. 
General Patrick J. Hurley had labored since .August 
18, 1944, to bring about a conciliation between the 
Nationalist and the Communist elements in China and 
succeeded in several par ti cu lars of preparing the groum -
work for whatever success the retired Anny Chief of Staff 
t . 16 was o experience. It was January 8, 1945, that General 
( Patrick Hurley presented his credentials as the .American 
14Richard E. Lauterbach, Dan~r from the East (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 193oT, p. 259. 
15Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Years of Trial and Ho~e~ 
1946-195 2 (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc • , I9 7 J, 
p. 61. 
16ncrisis in China Ea sed," The Times (London), 
AugllSt 28, 1945, p. 4. 
8 
Ambassador to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek at Chungk ing; 
and from that moment until his resignation was sent to 
the President on November 26, 1945, he faced one crisis 
and dilemma after another. 17 The aggressive leaders on 
both sides of the Chinese political situation were not 
to be denied the opportunity to struggle for land and 
power through his endeavors. 
9 
The man who was to experience the full impact of this 
struggle was General George C. Marshall, and with him 
those officers and men of the United States Army that were 
sent to assist him during the period January 1, 1946, to 
March 1, 1947. Even though General Marshall was the head 
of a diplomatic mission, he utilized the resources of the 
U.S. Army to carry out the practical measures which the 
interest of the United States policy dictated. It had 
been General Marshall who persuaded Secretary of War Henry 
L. Stimson in 1942 to send General Joseph Stilwell to 
China because of his military reputation and knowledge of 
that area. 18 During the period of the war, Secretary 
Stimson and General Marshall had developed China aid to 
the best of their abilities in this crowded global conflict, 
with emphasis on Europe rather than Asia, and it was a 
fortuitous choice of President Harry S Truman to pick 
17u.s. Department of tate, U.S .• Relations with Chi~ 
1944-1249, nnex 50. 
18Henry L. Stimson, Diary, January 14, 1942, quoted in 
Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, £n Active Service in 
Peace and War, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948) p.-530. 
General Marshall and the United States Army to further 
United States policy in this unusual aspect of foreign 
affairs . 
10 
CH.APTER II 
EFFORTS OF THE U. S . TO KEEP 
CHINA IN THE SECOND WORLD W.AR 
The mi ssion of the Allied Powers and the United 
States from 1941 to 1945 was to keep China in the War. 
This was expressed in the Declaration of Cairo, which 
was released on December 1, 1943. 1 This Declaration 
agreed to by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Generalis~-
imo Chiang Kai Shek, and Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, announced ~llied policy to Japan an:1 Germany. 
Es sentially, Japan was to know that "the Three Great 
Allies are fi gpting t his war to restrain and punish 
th:l Eggression of Japan;' , and wi th these objects in view, 
the Three Allies, in harmony with other nations at war 
with Japan, "will continue to persevere in the serious 
and prolonged operations necessary to procure the un-
conditional surrender of Japan". One of the purposes 
as sta ted in the Declaration was that "all territories 
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, 
l 
U.S. Department of State Bulletin, IX (December 1 
19 43) , p. 3 93 • ' 
11 
Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the 
2 
Republic of Chinatt. 
In spite of t his public pronouncement, the u. s. 
contribution to the Chinese war effort was primarily in 
diplomatic endeavor and military supplies. 3 Only two 
12 
rout es of passage existed fro m the United States to China. 
These were the Burma Read and the so-called Hump. The 
latter was the name given to the air transport of military 
e quipment, gasoline, and impedimenta over the unusually 
high Hima laya Mountains by the U. s. Air Force. Com-
plications developed almost immediately af ter the out-
break of war with Japan . In the first p lace the J apanese 
closed too Burm.a Read when t h ey occupied Burma in 1942. 
Secondly, the amount of supplies and e (!uipment that an 
airplane could carry over the Himalaya Mountains l\las se(riously 
limited. The pay load of the average airplane was two 
ton. Finally Chiang 1-ai Sbek continually hoarded the 'ehin 
trick le of milit ary e ouip.m.ent for future action against 
tre Chinese Communists instead of employing t hem at once 
against the Jap anese. General Joseph Stilwell sdilruggled 
manfully wit h these problems as U. s . Armed Forces 
Re presentative in China and Chief of S taff of Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai Soo k , but he was relieved from his post because 
----------------
2Ibid. 
3u.s. Department of State, loo. cit., p. 71. 
13 
he insisted that t he Kuoming t ang leader make changes in 
his control and administra tion of the Chinese Ar mies and 
of the resourc es of the Chinese nation.4 
\ hen General Stilwell was recalled, Genera l Albert 
C. Wedemeyer was appointed to t he China The a ter as Com-
mander of the U.S. Forces and Advisor to Chiang Ka i Shek . 
General Patrick J. Hurley, who had been Secreta ry of War 
under President Herbert C. Hoover and a succ essful cor-
poration l awyer, was already on the ground, having been 
dispa tched by President Roosevelt to act as a mediator 
between the Kuomingtang and the Comm.unists.5 He had 
been accompanied to Chungking by Donald M. Ne l s on to 
survey China's economic future. Mr. Donald Ne lson re-
turned to Vlashington on September 24, 1944, and rendered 
a report to the President on what steps the United S t a tes 
should take to strengthen China's war economy. Then 
at the Generalissimo's request, the Nelson group was 
returned to China as the .American War Production Mi s sion. 
It ga thered data and continued to operate until its 
final report was given to President Truman on 
December 18, 1945. 
China's contribution to the war effort was diver-
sionary and served to keep great quantities of men and 
---------------
4nstilwell Must Go," New York Times, October 31, 1944, 
p. 3. 
5nyahoo," ~' Vol. 45, January 1, 1945, p. 28. 
14 
war materials of dapan tied up on the mainland of China. 6 
These men and .materials could not be withdrawn and used 
against the U. S . combined air, sea and land invasion 
program which was proceeding und er General Douglas 
MacArthur in the Pacific. 
While en route to Chungking , General Hurley and 
Donal d M. Ne lson visited Moscow to t a l k over Chinese 
participation in the War. They conferred with the Russian 
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Mo lotov, who convinced 
them of Russia's desire for comp lete Chinese co ope ration. 7 
His remarks are reflected in the report which General 
Patrick Hurley transmitted to President Roosevelt on 
September 23, 1944. They are: 
1tA s early as the 8th of September the Generalissimo 
said to me th a t he was willing, for the pur pose of the 
unification of China, tbat the Communist troops should 
be incorporated into the National Anny but they should 
serve as components of the Chinese Army and not as a 
sepa rate or independent force and finally , t hat th ey 
must submit to the comm.and of t he Generalissimo. The 
Generalissimo has been working on this su b•j ect dilig ently 
since our arrival here. Las t week he caused to be pub-
lished the terms submitted by the so-called Communists , 
and he del ivered an address on the s ubject to the People's 
Politica l Council. All of wh ich l eads toward har mony 
with the so-called Communist troops. I am insisting 
t ha t the conference be shortened and that action be t aken 
wi t hout delay. I am familiar with t he State Department 
mes s age to the Generalissimo on the Communist question. 
I have informed the Generalissimo that the so-called 
Communist troops in China are not considered real Com-
munists by Molotov; Russia's attitude toward China is 
friendly and tha t Russia is not a tt empting to use the 
Co.mm.unist troops to prevent military unifica tion of China. 
---------------
7 U.S. Department of S tate, loc. cit., p . 71. 
Russia desires closer and more . harmonious relations 
with China. I am familiar with your message v.hich 
General Stilwell delivered to the Generalissimo on 
September 19th. I have been advising the Generalissimo 
not to make a response to your note which might caus e 
a deadloc k . Wba t is needed to save the situation in 
China is harmonious action, not a dead lock. The General-
issimo reali zes this. n8 
The pur ~.ose of u. s. policy makers, to reconcile the 
Chirese Natiore.lists and the Communists into one working, 
harmonious, compact nation had existed ever sine e the 
u. s. had rec ognized tre Re public of China as the 
legitimate government on July 6, 1928. N'hen Chiang Kai 
Shek was a rrested and held captive in Sian, Shensi, and 
held captive from December 12 to 25, 1936, by the inde-
pendent leader of Manc huria, Chang Hseuh-liang, Americans 
were appalled.9 However, when it became known that he 
and his captors had agreed on combining the Communist 
effort against the Japanese with that of his Kuoming tang 
forces, the U. S. polio y .makers were pleased. 
One of the results of the Undeclared War of J apan 
on China on July 7, 1937, was that the Central Committee 
15 
of the Communist Party issued a Manifesto announcing the 
formation of a united front with the Kuoming tang .lO The 
very next day, the Generalissimo applauded the Manifesto. 11 
--------------~ 
~eeort, Hurley to President, 23 September 1944, 
quoted in Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, 
Stilwell's Command Problems (Washington: Office of 
Chief of Milit ary History, 1955), p. 450. 
9Gunther Stein, The Challen~e of Red China, (New 
York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc. 1945T p. 16. 
10u.s. Department of State, loo. cit., Annex 36. 
11Ibid, Annex 27. 
16 
In the early days of World War II both the Nationalists 
and the Communists actively fought the Japanese, but as 
.American aid continued to flow over the Hump route in in-
creasing quantities, none of it was given to the Communists 
by Chiang Kai Shek; and as the Communist Eighth Route Army 
became more fir.m..y established and learned how to govern 
populace and area, its unit commanders became less inclined 
to fight the Japanese, except in guerrilla operations~2 
Communist growth ran counter to U. s. policy of recognizing 
the National Government of Chiang Kai Shek, as the only 
legal government in Chinao The problem of reconciling these 
two major factions was pointed up later among the instruc-
tions which General Marshall received from President Tru-
man , when he departed on his mission!3 The instructions 
were excerpts from a public hearing before the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee on December 7, 1945, in which 
Secretary of State James E. Byrnes said: 
"During the war, the immediate goal of the United 
States in China was to provide a military union of the sev-
eral political factions in order to bring their combined 
power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our long range 
goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, 
is the development of a strong united and democratic China. 
"To achieve this longer range goal, it is essential 
12 Gunther Stein, loo.cit., p. 335. 
13Memorandum by Secretary Byrnes, December 9, 1945, 
quoted in John L. Stuart, E!_fty Years in China (New York: 
Random House, 1954) p. 316. 
17 
that the central Government of China as well as the various 
dissident elements approach the settlement of their differ-
ences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, 
as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, 
that the Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek affords 
the most satisfactory base for a developing demooracyo But 
we also believe that it must be broadened to include the 
representatives of those large and well organized groups who 
are without any voice in the government of China. 
"This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact 
and discretion, patience and r estraint. It will not be 
solved by the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent 
that our influence in the light of shifting conditions in 
such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Gov-
ernment, by the so-called Communists, and by the other 
factions.n:L4 
Experienced negotiator that he was, General Hurley's 
role as a mediator was made more difficult by the gradual 
awareness of the Chinese of the terms of the Yalta agree-
ment. This agreement was signed on February 11, 1945, by 
the three Allied chiefs; Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. 
The terms, though apparently pleasing to the Allies, were 
a bitter pill for the Chinese to swallowt5 It was hard for 
them to recognize that the Western Nations would pay the 
price for Russia's participation in the War against Japan 
by the partition of Manchuria especially since that Province 
had been accepted as belonging to China in the 1943 con-
ference at Cairo 0 Specific applicable agreements were: 
"(l) The status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be pre-
served. 
"(2) The former rights of Russia lost to the Japanese 
----------------
14~. 
l5"The Yalta Conference"(editorial), 1'.he Chungkins 
Re£orter, Vol. II No. 50, February 14, 19460 
18 
in 1904 shall be restored with r espect to (a) the southern 
part of Sakhalin, (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall 
be internationalized with the Soviet Union having the pre-
eminent interest and the lease of Port Arthur as a Naval 
base will be revived, and (c) the Chinese Eastern Railroad 
and the South Manchurian Railroad shall be operated jointly 
by a Soviet Chinese Company, it being understood that the 
preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguard-
ed and that China shall retain full sovereignty. 
"(3) The Kurile Islands will be ceded to Russ ia. 0 16 
The Yalta Conference resulted in several unusual 
understandings and statements among the Allies who signed 
the agreement. One was that the President will take meas-
ures in order to obtain the concurrence of Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai Shek, on the advice of Marshal Stalin, or the 
agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and rail-
roads of Manchuria. The Yalta Agreement then concludes: 
"For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to 
conclude with the National Government of China a pact of 
friendship and alliance, between the USSR and China; in 
order to render ass istance to China, with its armed forces, 
for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke." 
Of course, China was not represented at the Yalta 
Conference and President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. 
The pur poses of the Yalta Agreement were accepted 
and formalized by the Government of Chiang Kai Shek in the 
---------------
160The Yalta Agreements!' . New York Times, March 25, 
1947, p. 144. 
19 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of friendship and alliance, which was 
negotiated by Wang Shih Chieh and Molotov in Moscow¾7 This 
and five other treaties, were signed on August 14, 1945, 
and were scheduled to continue for thirty years. Their re-
ception in China was favorable; as it was a step towards 
the solution of problems that plagued both countries for 
many years. The provisions of these treaties which stated 
that both powers pledged themselves "to give each other all 
possible economic assistance in the postwar period with a 
view to lightening and speeding up the national rehabili-
tation of both countries" when viewed in the light of sub-
sequent events, proved to be high sounding wordst8 
Immediately after the signing of the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty, Ambassador Hurley was successful in bringing to-
gether Mao Tse Tung and Chiang Kai Shek in conference on 
August 28, 1945}9 This meeting continued until October 11, 
1945, when Chairman Mao departed for Yenan~0 Both Communists 
and Nationalists seemed desirous of ending the civil strife 
and reaching a political settlemento These meetings with 
Mao Tse Tung clearly showed the basic problems which were 
Mac 
17Harold Isaacs (ed.), New cicle 
Millan Company, 1947), pp. 3J-J9o in Asia (New York: 
18 
u.s.,Department of State, _l_o_c_._c_i_t., Chapter lV. 
19 May ling Soong Chiang, "China:' , Ten Eventful Years, 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 1, 1947, p. 654. 
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~., pp. 73-107;New York Times, September 2,1945, 
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current and ran so deeply through Chinese thinking. The 
Communists demanded an immediate end of one party rule, the 
establishment of a coalition government, and a new election 
of delegates for the fabulous National Assembly. The Gener-
alissimo agreed to recognize the legal status of all polit-
ical parties. He insisted, however, that the Communists 
lay down their arms before negotiations continued. Pro-
vision was made that a Political Consultation Conference 
should be assembled. The purpose of this group was to 
decide the when and the how of the calling of the National 
Assembly. It was to consist of thirty eight members from 
all parties and non-partisan groups. 
While the talks with Mao Tse Tung were going on, in 
September, General Patrick Hurley left China and returned 
to the United States. Perhaps because he had been a Repub-
lican Secretary of War under President Herbert c. Hoover 
and because he was out of sympathy with what he called pro-
Communist leanings of the State Department advisors in 
Chungking and Washington, he resigned in bitterness on 
November 26, 1945~1 
The reception of General Hurley's resignation coin-
cided with the availability of the services of General 
George c. Marshall. He retired from the exacting position 
of Chief of Staff of the Armies of the United States on 
November 20, 1945, at his own request. In this position 
21Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach, loc. cit., 
p. 639. 
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he had been present and guided the build-up of United 
States military might, ever since the month of September, 
1939, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him. 
This one time aide-de-camp of General John J. 
Pershing and distinguished graduate of the Virginia Mili-
tary Institute, had been present with President Roosevelt 
at the pre-war conference where the Atlantic Charter was 
formulated and at all subsequent Big Three Meetings~2 He 
also attended the Cairo Conference with Chiang Kai Shek. 
He was held in esteem throughout China by both the Chinese 
Nationalist and the Communist Party sympathizers~3 During 
his junior officer days, he had served with the 15th u. s. 
Infantry Regiment in Tientsin, China for a period of three 
years. Above all he was aware of the great contribution 
that China made to the overall war effort and more than 
familiar with the price which the United ~tates had paid 
in men and money to keep China in the war. 
-----------------~ 
22Katherine Tupper Marshall, 6o~ether~ Annals of an 
Army Wife >(New York: Tupper and Love, Inc., I940J, p. 290. 
23Tillman Durdin, "Chinese Government and Communist 
Reaction to General Marshall!'- The New York Times, December 
17, 1945. 
CHAPTER III 
GENERAL MARSHALL'S CONCEPT 
OF HIS MI SSI ON TO CHINA 
General Marshall was appointed .by President Harry 
S . Truman to be his special representative to China with 
the rank of an Ambassador on Novoober 21, 1945. Im-
mediately thereafter he was on the way to that war torn 
area with Colonel Henry A. Byroade, U. s . Army, as mili-
tary attache and Mr. James Shep ley, representing the 
1 S t a te Depa rtment. General Marshall's office was to con-
tinue until Janua ry 7, 1947, when he was nominated to be 
Secretary of S tate of the United States. During this 
period of slightly over one year, Gen eral Marshall proved 
to be one of the most active and resourceful medi a tors 
emp loyed by the United St a tes in the post-war per iod.. 
On Dec ember 15, 1945, while General Marshall was 
flying over t h e Pac i fic enroute to his new p l a ce of duty, 
President Truman i ssued a statement of United States policy 
toward China. It outlined the hopes for peace enter t ained 
1Felix Belair, Jr., "Truman to Issue China Plan 
Today!' ~ New York Times, December 15, 1945, p . 1. 
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by the citizens of the United S t a te s and was to govern 
Gene ral Marshall's t houghts and actions for the coming 
ye ar. 2 The policy decla r ation was published in the New 
York Times over an As so cia ted Pres s dateline of December 
16, 1945. It reads as follows: 
"The Government of the United St ates holds that 
_peace and prosperity of the world in this new and un-
explored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sover-
eign na tions to combine for collective security in the 
United Na tions Organization. 
"It is the firm belief of this Government that a 
strong , united and democratic China is of the utmost im-
portance to the success of t his United Nations Or ganiza-
tion and for world peace. A Chi na disorganized and 
divided eith er by forei gn aggr ession, such as that under-
taken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is 
an undermining influence to world stability and peace, 
now and in the future. 
"The United States Government ha s long subscribed 
to the p rinciple t.ba. t t he management of internal affairs 
is the responsibility of the people of the sovere ign 
nations. Events of this century, however, would indicate 
that a breach of peace anywhere in the world t hreatens 
the peace of the entire world. It is t hus in t he most 
vital interest of the United Sta tes and all t he United 
Na tions that t he people of China ov erlook no opportuni t y 
to adjust t heir internal differences promptly by me th ods 
of peaceful ne got ia t ion." 
The policy continues with obj ectives which General 
Geo r ge Mar shall was expected to bring about by a pplying 
the full f orce of the American diplomatic power upon the 
ci vil war, aga i nst both t he Chungking Gov er nment and the 
Yenan Committee Communist Party units. These a r e in brief; 
(1) The return of all China to eff ec t ive Chinese control 
including t he immediate evacua tion of J apan ese forces, 
2
"President Truman's S t a tement of China Policy:, . 
The New York Times, December 16, 1945, p . 3. 
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(2) a National Conference of representatives of major 
political ele.me n ts to develop an early solution to the 
present international strife, (3) all of China, including 
Manchuria to be under Chinese control and all agreements 
made with the National Gov ernment of the Republic of China, 
(4) to assist the National Government in effecting the 
disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese in the liberated 
areas; the U. s. Marines are in Northern China for thEt 
purpose, (5) to assist the Na tional Government in every 
r easonable way to reestablish the agrarian and industrial 
economy and establish a military organization c apable of 
dis charging Chinese national and international responsi-
bilities for the maint enance of peace and order, ( 6} the 
United States support will not extend to U. s. military 
intervention to influence the course of any Chinese in-
ternal strife, and (7) The u. s. will be prepared to 
give fair consid eration to Chinese reques ts for trade 
and loans under reasonable conditions, for projects wh ich 
would contribute toward the development of a healthy 
economy throughout China and healthy trade rel a tions 
between China and the United States. 
General Marshall set foot on Chinese soil on Thursday, 
December 20, 1945, at Shanghai and conferred with Lieuten-
ant General Albert c. Wedemeyer, who was then in command 
of the United States Forces in China. 3 After a business 
3Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 269. 
consult a tion, he proceeded to Chungking where he met 
Chiang Kai Srek . The Generalissimo a cc epted his credentials 
and on January 1, 1946, General Marshall commenced his 
labor of mediator and friend of China with the aid of both 
parties. His resid ence, Yu Gardens, provided by t he 
National Government, became the s cene of a three party 
conference from which emana ted an armistice in a period 
of ten days. The conferees were General Chang Chung f or 
the Na tional Government, representing Chiang Kai Shek, and 
General Chou En Lai, who repr esented the Communist Party 
of Mao Tse Tung. 4 General Marshall was at home to all 
political parties and all visitors. 5 He asked them 
questions, listened to the answers, and did not make 
many comments. In dealing with Chang Chung and Chou En 
Lai, however, General Marshall was persuasive and made 
bold compromising s uggestions. Since Chang Chung had the 
confidence of the Generalissimo -- he had been a former 
cla s smate and t he Gov ernor of Szechwan Province -- and 
Chou En Lai was well known to him, having been Chief of 
the Wampoa Mill tar y Academy under his command, bold sug-
gestions were required. Both negotia tors trusted General 
Marshall. In spite of differences of opinion, General 
Marshall's initial efforts were richly rewarded when on 
January 10, 1946, the President of the Chinese Rep ublic 
¾J. s. Department of State, 02. cit., p . 134. 
5nMarshall Receives Party Delegates;' . The ChunM_i!!B_ 
Reeorter, Vol I I , Nr. 43, December 27, 194). 
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unexpectedly announced the cessation of hostilities. 6 
A Central News Agency disp a tch from Chungking, China, 
dated January 11, 1946 announced the terms of the 'cease 
fire' armistice. 7 It provided that all forces of the 
Na tional Government and all fighting units under the con-
trol of the Communist Party, whether they be regular forces, 
militia, irregular troops or guerx.illas, carry out the 
following or ders: 
"l. All armed clashes to be stopped immediately. 
"2. Unless otherwise permitted, all troop move-
men ts within Chinese territory to be halted. Howe ver, 
military movements deemed necessary for insuring safety 
in restoration work, transfer of garrisons and transfer 
of military supplies and enforcements of political admini-
stration and local peace are to be accepted. 
"3. All activities calculated to destroy or ob-
struct communic a tions to be suspended. All obstacles 
to communic ations to be removed immediately. 
"4. For the enforcement of cease fire, an Executive 
Headquart ers to be es t a blished which is to be composed of 
three members: one representing the Chinese Government; 
one the Chinese Communist Par ty; and one the United 
S t a tes of America. All ins tructions or ord ers shall be 
issued with full agreement between the three members and 
s hall be promulgated t hrough the Head quar t ers in the 
name of the President of the National Government of the 
Chinese Republic." 
An explanation of the unusual feature of the American 
member in the enforcement of the cease fire, according to 
the news dispa tch v1a s that the American was to assist 
both Chine se . It was furt he r agreed that the Head auar ters 
was to have such a numbe r of officers and enlisted men 
6
"Political Cons .ultation Conference Opens Today," : 
The Chungking Reporter, Vol II, Nr. 45, January 10, 1946. 
711 cease Fire Order Issued to All Chinese Commanders 
Last Night:'. The Pei,2i~ Chronicle, January 11, 1946, p . 1. 
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as to insure the enforcement of the ce ase fire. Each 
member of the Headquarters was aut horized to set up 
separate lines of communic ations in or der to i ns ur e a 
s pe edy and unint err up t ed fl~~ of me ssages. 
In addition to t he r eac hing of an a greement on the 
cease fire ord er, the meet i ng of t he Political Cons ult a-
tive Confe r ence convened at Chungking and me t in session 
until J anuary 31, 1946. 8 The calling of t hi s confer ence 
had been an enterpri s e of Ambass ad or, Major Gener a l 
Pa trick J. Hurley, who had angrily r es i gne d 1 • s position 
jus t prior to the appointment of Gen eral Marsh a ll to the 
China post. Gene ral Hurley had visit ed Mao Tse Tung in 
Yenan and obtained his a gr eement that t he Political Con-
sult a tive Conf er ence should meet. Gene r a l Hurley also 
brought Chou En Lai bacl to Chunglcing wit h h i m, and laid 
the groundwork for the meeting of the political repr esenta-
tives of t he Communist and s p linter parties in China. 
Gen e raliss imo Chiang Kai She k opened th e conf er ence with 
the announc ement of the 'cease f ire' armistice and his 
desire t o c arry it out. There were represent atives of 
all parties pr esent. 9 Among the number pr es ent were 
eight f rom the Kuoming tang; seven from the Communist 
Party; five from the China Youth Party; nine from the 
8H. P . Tseng , "The Political Consulta tiv e Conference" . 
(edit or ial) The Chungking Re2orter, Vol. I I , Nr. 45 ' 
(January 10, 194ET, p . 4. 
9u. s . Depar tment of State, OQ• cit., p . 139. 
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four party Democratic Lea gue; and nine from independent 
groups. In spite of their div e;rse backgrounds, and be-
cause of their desire for peace and cooper ation, the con-
ference found much to agree on and in closing, voiced 
several propositions whi ch indicated t heir accord. 10 These 
included: 
( 1) 
(2) 
( 3) 
1946; 
( 4) 
ized; 
Tha t a coalition government be fo rmed immedia tely ; 
that constitutional government be approved; 
tha t tbe National Assembly meet on March 5, 
that the draft cons ti tut ion of 1936 be liberal-
( 5 ) that the opposing armie s be reorganiz ed and 
nationalized; 
(6) that agrarian, educational, and industrial 
reforms be instituted; and 
(7) that civil liberties be made available to all 
i:e rso ns and groups. 
The agree.m.ents of the Committee of Three and the 
Political Consult a tive Conference provided the basic 
principles which were to be tried and tested during the 
remainder of the critical year 1946. 
10 Tillman Durden, "Reds Won Big Gains in China 
Coalition," . The N~w York Times, February 2, 1946, p • .3; 
and nReds wJ.11 Keep FCC Agreements," . orth-China Dail.,l 
~ (Shanghai), Vol. £VII, Februel!'y 2, 1945, p. 1. 
CHl-1 PTER IV 
THE TOCLS OF THE OPERATiuN 
General Marshall was a man of action and the United 
States Army had been and wa s to c ontinue to be his oper-
a ting tool. In his confE:!rence wi t h General Wedemeyer, 
on December 20, 1945, at Shanghai, h e had indic a. ted t b.a t 
he would establish a Head ouart ers at Pek ing , to operate 
his truce mechanism. 1 In orde r to prepare for this 
act i vity, Colonel Wes ley c. Wilson was flO\AJn, on a United 
States Marine C46 plane , to Pek ing on January 1, 1946, 
with a mission t o find a suitable loc ation and set up 
f acili t i e s for a Three Government Headquart ers •2 It was 
outlined that each unit would contain a bout fifty officers, 
each wi th accompanying s tenogr aphers , command, and com-
munication systems to cover all of China. The Fifth 
United S tates Marine Reg i rent was controlling Peking at 
the time. It was commanded by Brigadier General Lawrence 
1
"Peiping Named Cease Fire Headquarters," . The Pei ,2ins_ 
Chronicle, January 12, 1946. 
2 
History, Peiping Executive Headquarte1·s in the 
Office of Chief of Military History, U.S . Army file , F irst 
Quarter, 1946, Folder V. Hereafter cited as History, 
Peiping Executive Headquarters . 
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Jones of the United States Marine Corps. Lieutenant 
Colonel J. W. M. Read of the United States Army was the 
officer representing the China Theater in that ancient 
capital city. Colonel Wilson found these two officers 
very helpful during the process of looking trough existing 
buildings and talking through interpreters to Chinese 
officials who had just received custody of palaces, of-
f ices, warehouses, compounds, and dwellings from the re-
cently defeated and still present Japanese Army. 
The teeming city of Peking, with its uncertain 
future, seemed an impossible place to locate a building 
ruitable as a head quarters for a civil mission. Then by 
a stroke of good fortune, Mr. Trevor Bowen, Administrator 
of the Peking Union Medical College, offered to lend the 
resources of that facility for the purpose. It was a 
.masterpiece of Chinese and Are rican architecture. The 
Medical College and Hospital had been built by the 
Rockefeller Found ation, China Medical Board Division, and 
utilized during the war by the Jap anese as a .military 
hospita1. 3 Mr. Trevor Bowen was anxious to ke ep the pro-
perties from f alling into the hands of the Nationalist 
' 
Chinese who were appropriating everything in the city 
which their force and agressiveness could put a finger 
on. :Mr. Bowen told Colonel Wilson and Gen e ral Jones 
3Letter of Dr. Harold H. Louchks, MD. China Medical 
Board of New York, August 14, 1956, to Colonel W. c. 
Wilson. 
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when he offered the giant hospital: If t h is peace effort 
fails, all of China as we know it will f all into anarchy 
and civil war. n4 
Within a pe riod of four teen day s the Executive Head-
quarters, as it was titled, was set up by a small capable 
staff of United States Army officers and enlisted men who 
had been sent up from Shanghai on ord ers of General 
Wedemeyer. 5 His China Theater Command was already busily 
engaged in numerious mi ssions. It was in the process of 
returning the United States troops from China, supplying 
lend lease to the French in Indo-China, and trans porting 
Na tionalist Armies by air to Shanghai, Nanking, and Peking. 6 
The l a tter moves were p art of the pro gram of assisting the 
Nationalist Kuomingtang Government in reoccupying Japanese 
held areas and opening lines of communications. It is 
estimated t ha t be tween four hundred thousand and five 
hum.red thousand Chinese soldiers were moved to key areas 
by air and wa ter alone. In order to assist the China 
Theater, fifty thousand United States Marines were placed 
in Peking , Tientsin, the coal mines in the vicinity of 
Tientsin, and along the railroad lines between both places. 
The Marines also a ssisted in the repa triation of the 
---------------
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4Interview with Mr. Trevor Bowen, J anuary 4 , 1946. 
5Bertram D. Hulen, "New Directive to General Wedemeyer ," 
New York Times, December 18, 1945, p . 1. 
6nBi g Chinese Units Flown into Manchuri an Areas," 
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Japanese. 
The members of the Peiping Executive Head quarters 
arrived from two loc ations on January 11, 1946 in United 
States Army planes. The planes ca.me at dusk from Chungking 
ard Shanghai and landed at West Field, Peking. The 
passengers included Colonel Henry A. Byroade, Colonel Louis 
W. Haskell, Colonel Eugene B. Ely, Colonel Milo H. 
Matteson, seven otrer officers and ten enlisted men. 
The 3198th Signal Ser vice Battalion from Shanghai also 
sent a detachment of three officers and ten enlisted men. 
A Headquarters was temporarily established in the 
Grand Hotel de Wagon-Lits which was being operated by the 
~rar Area Service Corps of the National Military Council 
of the Chinese National Government. Officers were bil-
letted in the Hotel de Peking and enlisted men were bil-
letted in the Central Hotel. Tra vel by plane was furnished 
by the Air Transport Comm.and, S 110.nghai, and the 513th 
Troop Carrier S quadron. Motor transportation was supplied 
by the 5th Regiment, United States Marine Corps. Colonel 
Henry A. Byroade, General S taff Cor_p3, United States Anny, 
assl.llI:ed comm.and of the personnel in Peking in accordance 
with General Order Number 1, J>eiping Headquarters Group, 
7 dated January 11, 1946. 
On January 12th an Army C47 plane brought an ad-
ditional three officers and nine enlisted men from Shanghai. 
7History, Peiping Executive Head quarters, loc. cit., 
First Quarter 1946, Folder I. 
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This raised the st reng th of the military pe r s onnel in 
Peiping He ad quarters to a to ta l of sixteen of fic ers and 
twenty-eigh t enlisted men. All made r eady for the three 
cease fire commissioners who were to arrive soon at We st 
Field aboard General Marshall's pe rsonal airplane from 
Chungking . The Commissioners were Mr. Walter S . Robertson, 
U. s . Charge D' Affaires of the Embassy with the rank of 
Minister and United States Commi ssioner of the Executive 
8 Head quarter s; Maj or General Cheng Kai-Ming of the Ministry 
of Ope rations, the National Gov ernment's representative; 
and General Yeh Chien-Ying, Chief of Staff, Ei ghteenth 
Group Anny, Communist Party. They were all to be quartered 
in the Grand Hotel de Pek ing until more pe rmanent accom-
mcii at ions could be arranged. 9 They arrived on schedule 
at about 2 P .M. t hat same a f ternoon. 
On January 14 the Executive Head0uarters began 
o~rat ion in the Pek ing Union Medi cal Colle ge. Besides 
t he Three Commissioners , a detail of numerous assistants 
was provided for each. Immediately und er them was a three 
10 
man group known as the Plans and Operations Section. 
Its members were Maj or General Chow Li-wu, Nationalist 
Government Branch; Major General Li Chu-kui, Communist 
8u. s . Department of State, loc. cit., Annex 71. 
9
"Three Commissioners of New Headquarters Here.," . 
The Pei£ins Chronicl~ Janua ry 14, 1946. 
lOi bid., Annex 71c. 
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Party Branch ; and Colonel Eugene B. Ely of the United 
S t a tes Army . P l a n es of the 513th Troop Carrier Squadron 
kept arriving from Shanghai and were unloaded as :fast as 
possible. In all 7 jeeps, 372 arctic parkas, 479 sleeping 
bags, r ad ios, gen e r al military stores, and to add to the 
worries of all, two truckloads o:f Post Exchange candy, 
tob acco, sundries, and toile t supplies we r e unloaded and 
moved to protected storage . Thi s small :force o:f o:f:fic e:-r ·s 
am enlisted men who had previous ly ser ved in China in 
many capacities were inclined to be scep tical o:f the pro-
ject but Colonel Henry A . Byroade was so enthusiastic that 
he persuaded the United Sta tes personnel o:f the rightness 
o:f the Peace Mission and fired them wi t h his zeal . La t er 
on the Dep a rtment o:f t be .Army promoted him to the grade o:f 
Bri gad ier General . 
The Three Commissioners met at the Executive Head-
quarters and began building up their own personal sta:f:fs . 
They hired workers locally and brought officials :from other 
Na tiona list and Communist Head quarte r s in China. Their 
:first major considera tion was the danger areas where di:f-
f ic ultie s mi ght occur in enforcing the truce which had 
been declared e:ffe ctive on January 13, 1946. In an attempt 
to head o:f:f potential difficulties t hey directed three 
related actions: :first, on January 15, U. s . Marine air-
craft were to drop l eafelets in the area of Chih-Feng in 
Jehol Province and ov er :four teen tons of l eafelets in the area 
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of Sui Yuan, Shantung, and Hopei; 11second, Executive Head-
quarters by Special Orders Number One dispatched field 
teams to Chi Ning, Sui Yuan Province; Chih Feng, Jehol Pro-
vince; Tsinan, Shantung Province; Hsuchow, Kiang Su Pro-
vince;Tatung, Shansi Province; and Kalgan, Chahal Province; 
and third, Trusum Number One, the first of many truce Sum-
maries of the Three Commissioners was approved and dispatch-
ed to the Chungking Liaison Group, Chungking, China, for 
transmission to General Chiang Kai Shek, General Mao Tse 
Tung, and General Marshali. 12 
By the terms of the original agreement of General 
Marshall's Committee of Three, the Commissioners at Peking 
were to act under the United States Commissioner as the 
chairman. They were to issue directives in the name of 
Chiang Kai Shek. The latter had insisted on this recog-
nition and further that he name both the Communist and Na-
tionalist Commissioners. 
United States Air Force planes were placed at the 
disposal of the Communists to enable them to bring repre-
sentatives to Peking to man the office and the field teams 0 
The first truce team was that dispatched to Chih Feng under 
the direction of Colonel Raymond R. Tourtillot of the u. s . 
Army. It and similar teams consisted basically of three 
----------------
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12 History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
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key members: a Nationalist Army Colonel; a Communist Party 
Colonel; and au. s. Army Colonel. Three interpreters, and 
one American soldier who was to be both the jeep and radio 
operator rounded out each team. Each team depended on the 
planes of the Troop Carrier Squadron to bring supplies 
when needed • .All teams were instructed to deliver "cease 
fire" orders to both Nationalist and Communist Commanders, 
stop local fighting, and maintain contact with the Execu-
tive Headquarters!3 Within a week, seven teams were on the 
ground and active in North China. Initially their efforts 
were successful because they were employing the tools of 
war and speaking the language of war to officers and men 
in order to effect peace. 
The truce teams were first dispatched and in place 
by the end of January 1946 were as follows: 14 
Team 1 Col. Alexander H. Craig Chi Ning 
Team 2 Col. Ray R. Tourtillot Chih Feng 
Team 3 Col. Harold w. Holly Ta Tung 
Team 4 Col. Donald Q. Harris Hsuchow 
Team 5 Col. Lee V. Harris Kalgan 
Team 7 Col. John P. Lake Tainan 
Team 8 Col. Paul R. Miller Canton 
Team 10 Col. John M. Ferguson Hsin Hsiang 
-----------------
l3ncease Fire Order .Arrive~' - ~he PeiEins Chronicle, 
January 14, 1946. 
14
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In the hurry of equipping, dispatching, and setting 
up field teams, many incidents occurred which had a tragic-
comedy appearance. To begin with, points were picked out 
on the map for teams to go to because the existing maps 
showed an important, centrally located town or road junction. 
Several teams arrived at the map location and found them-
selves exactly nowhere. The maps had been drawn and places 
marked in the map makers laboratory without reference to 
the ground. One Army Colonel with his Communist and Nation-
alist associates and the rest of the team, landed on an air-
field and found the location as planned, but all were im-
mediately placed under arrest by the Russian Battalion 
which was holding the area~5 After a week of living on a 
diet of barbecued mutton and millet as provided by their 
captors in a Chinese mud hut in sub-zero weather, the party · 
was released. Before allowing them to return to Peking, 
they were royally entertained~6 Vodka toasts in huge water 
glasses soon thawed the peace makers out. The Russian 
Battalion Commander had obtained a release for them from 
Moscow. Then he let the party go back as soon as a plane 
could be brought in. This incident is illustrative of the 
lack of information and preparation that the United States 
Army personnel, with their Chinese counterparts had in the 
----------------~ 
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initial stages of this enterprise. 
In Peking, the three branches of the headquarters 
were expanding rapidly. The halls of the great Hospital 
resounded with American and Chinese conver sation,the noises 
of typewriters and telephones, and the footfalls of news-
paper correspondents and ttVery Important Persons". By 
January 21, Major Charles R. Malony of the u. s. Marine 
Corps had installed a telephone switchboard whose initial 
circuit was to the Marine Headquarters Brigade in Tientsin 0 
This Brigade was in direct contact with Shanghai by tele-
type and acted as a relay station for the Peiping Executive 
Headquarters. With the assistance of Dr. ~ayne Wuhu King, 
who had once conducted classes of anatomy at the Peking 
Union Medical College before the War, forty one Chinese 
Nationals were employed to drive vehicles, answer telephones, 
handle supplies, unload and load airplanes and process or-
ders and telegramso The United States Army strength was 
now fifty six officers and ninety four enlisted men. It al-
most equalled the number originally scheduled by the China 
Theatero Besides the radio facilities of the headquarters, 
each field team operated heavy radio transmitters and re-
ceivers which enabled each group to communicate with its 
Party Headquarters and with the Executive Headquarters. 17 
General Henry Byroade in a speech to the populace 
17History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
First Quarter, 1946, Folder I. 
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at Penki, Manchuria, stated the United States mission in 
a few well chosen words. "The Americans are not in Execu-
tive Headquarters to judge who is right or wrong,"he said 0 
"Our mission is to form a framework of personnel and equip-
ment in which the Chinese themselves can work to reach 
agreements.n18 
An observer of the Headquarters in operation, Mr. 
Richard E. Lauterbach, Time and Life magazine correspon-
dent, who visited Peking and published his observations in 
his book, "Danger from the East", writes as follows: "Amer-
icans were more than equal members. The Chairman was to be 
the American Commissioner (Walters. Robertson) and under 
him an American Director (Brigadier General H. Byroade) 
was to run the staff work. In addition the United States 
contributed all the office and field equipment and most of 
the administrative know how. Throughout the whole organ-
i za t i on t he Americans were to be the dynamic yet magnetic 
force which linked two antagonistic bodies together and 
kept them moving in one main direction.nl9 
18Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 311. 
19 Ibid., p. 271. 
CH.APTER V 
TEAM PARTICIPATION IN THE FIELD 
· AND EVENTS AT PEKING 
The organization and dispatch of Field Teams to im-
portant localities in China was one of the eas iest tasks 
to perform by the United States Army personnel in the 
Peiping Executive Headquar ters. The guiding principles 
of the team participation in the area were a different 
.matter and came directly from the "cease fire" order. 
This order General Chiang Kai Shek of the Nationalist 
Gov er nmen t and Gener al Mao Tse Tung, Comm.unis t Party 
Chairman, issued jointly on January 10, 1946. 1 It was 
the memorandum. drawn up and agreed to by General Chang 
Chun and General Chou En-lai working with General George 
C. Marshall. In addition to providing for the formation 
and o_peration of the Executive Headquarters at Peking, 
it stated: 
"All uni ts, regular, militia , guerrilla and irregular 
of the National Armies of China and of Communist led troops 
of the Republic of China, are ordered to carry out the fol-
lowing directives: 
a. All hostilities will cease immediately. 
1u. S . Department of State, Annex 63. 
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b. Except in certain spec i fic cases, all move-
ment s of for ce s in China will cease. The re als o may be 
movements necessary for demobilization, redisposition 
supply, admi nistration, an d local security. ' 
c. Destruction of ani i nt erference with all lines 
of c ommunic a tions will cease and you will cl ear a t once 
obstructions p la ced agai n.s t or i nte r ferring with s uch lilies 
of co.mm.uni cations. n2 
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On t heir arrival in Pek i ng , and concurrent with the 
establishme nt of the Executive Headquarter s, the Three Com-
missioners developed, step by step , and word by word, General 
Directive Number Two, whic h was is s ued to the fi e ld teams 
and t actical units of both Armies on Janua ry 20, 1946. I t 
reads as follows: 
"In order to enforce the joint cease fire order of the 
Nati onal Gov ernment and t he Chinese Communis t Party , the fol-
lowing i mp lemen t ation principl es and procedures are adopted: 
" l. Pr i nc ipl es of cease fire impl ement a tion: 
a. Both par ties of a ll conflicting f orces will, 
upon r e cei p t of cease fire dir ective from this Executive 
Head quar ters, cease f ire i mmedi at ely and carry out s epa ra-
tion of the two c onf licting forces with a view to safeguard 
recurrence of conflicts. 
b. Sepa ration of the conflicting fo r ces wi ll be 
carri ed out in consonance with procedures s tipu l ated in 
Paragra ph 2 and action of this Head quarters. 
"2. Procedures of cease fir e i mp l e.roon t ati on: 
a. If one f orce hold s a cit y , t he othe r f orce will 
wi thdraw one day's march. 
b. If both f or ces are wi thin a city , both f orces 
will withdraw one day's march. 
c. In t he open, both f or ces will wi t hdraw one day's 
march from the points of cont act. 
d. All comman ders mus t t .ake i mmediate steps to 
make known to all troops , Cease Fir e Order and to en for ce 
t he order at once. 
e. As soon as forces a re se_p:3.rated and f i gh ting 
ha s stopped, steps will be taken by commanders to r~store 
position held as of midnight 13 Janua ry 1946 following 
same principles enunci a ted herein before. 
f. It is des ired to point out to commanders 
th a t decisions as to whom mi ght be ri gh t or wrong in any 
---------------
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particular case cannot be promptly or effectively re-
ndered, under the existing, difficult com.munications. The 
important objective is to stop fighting in compliance with 
jointly issued Cease Fire Order and withdraw. Final jud ge-
ment and adjustments must come at a later date. 
g. One day's march will be considered at least 
sixty (60) Chinese li. 
h. Field teams from this headquarters cannot be 
dispatched to each locality; therefore, comm.anders must 
take initiative to establish a liaison team and to maintain 
liaison between tbe two forces for enforcement of instruc-
tions given by this Headquarters. 
i. Special instructions will be issued to a 
Commander by the Executive Headquarters when careful evalua-
tion and study of the situation revels that the forces under 
his command are engaged in offensive action. Opposing parties 
on the ground will be instructed to establish liaison in each 
instance. The assumed defender will be given instructions 
to cooperate fully. j. Where large forces are involved and at strate-
gic places, this Head quarters will make every endeavor to 
dispatch teams to assist in the accomplishment of the measures 
pre scribed herein before. 
By Orde5 of President Chiang Kai Sbek of the 
National Government." 
The date/time of midnight January 13, 1946, became all 
important. Each field team represent ative searched and 
brough t proof to show where the troops were fighting at 
that specified time. 
One of the first successful teams was Team #lo at Hsin 
Hs iang in Honan Province. This team on February 5 announced 
local agreement after a long and difficult meeting between 
General Huang Wei-king , Chi ef of Staff, Com.munist Tai Hong 
Area Forces, and Colonel Chang Chin-chu, National Government 
85th Anny, located at Hsin Hsiang and Chen Hsien. The Truce 
Team was composed of Colonel Hwang Chung, repr esenting the 
Communist Par ty, Lieutenant Colonel Tseng Lo-tao, representing 
>"Peiping Head quarters Issues Directive #2J' . The 
Pei£ing Chronicle, January 22, 1946. 
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the Nationalist Government, and Colonel Alexander H. 
Cummings, United States Army , Chairman.4 The agreemen t 
they reached was as follows: 
"l. Neither side would take any offe.nsive action. 
"2. Both sides would release innocent captives. 
"3. The Communists would assume res pons i bili ty for 
repairing t hose sections of the Hsin Hsiang-Chi-Yuan branch 
railroad now in their hands. 
"4. The i mportant road west of Hsin Hsiang b6t ween 
Hw u Wu (held by the Na tionalists) and Chiao Tso (occupied 
by the Communists) would be repaired, and would not be used 
f,or aggressive action. Unarmed civilians would use the 
road, under the supervision of a liaison staff of politi cal 
workers of both sides, who would insure that the tra ve lers 
were unarmed. Civilians could move coal east from Chiao 
'l1so to Hsin Hs i ang and goods and commodities west from 
Hsin Hsiang to Chiao Tso."5 
The problem of stopping aggre s sive action was, as Henry 
R. Liebermann , New York Times correspondent, pointed out, 
one of improving communicat ions and re-establishing the roads 
and railroads. 6 The Communists had operated so long in the 
hills and the Nationalists in the hinterlands t hat when they 
Began jointly to share areas, each would build a military 
barrier aga inst the passage of the other. Then one would 
tear up the railroads and telephone and telegraph lines to 
the other's territory. But the Chinese people made the best 
of whate ver was ava ilable. So each military island would 
find itse lf with a part of a railroad running in its area. 
By mutual disagreement , the railroad train ran from one end of 
4"Four Agreements Reached by Hs in Hsiang Field Team," 
The Chunskin8 ReQorter, Vol. II , No. 49, February 7, 1946. 
5History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
Team Ten, Fol der IV. 
6Henry R. Liebermann, "North China Peace lmost 
Complete," The New York Times, February 2, 1946, p . 3. 
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the rails to the other. The passengers would alight. 
They would then trudge on foot across the no man's land of 
both sides and board tbe train in the adjacent area to con-
tinue their journey as far as the train would travel. 
The next mission of the Executive Headquarters was to 
attempt to patch up this railway tangle. 7 Colonel Donald 
C. Hill of the Corps of Engineers, United States Army, was 
placed in charge of railroad construction teams which were 
termed light teams. These consisted of three r epresenta-
tives, a Nationalist, a Communist and an American. They 
had no supplementary personnel because the depended on 
Truce Teams in their area of endeavor for assistance in the 
transmission of messages and the receipt of information. The 
senior communication member for the Nutional Government was 
Colonel Chen Lu-hwa. A ouantity of United States milit ary 
e quipment and Lend Lease supplies we re availa ble. Im-
mediately surveys were made, and it was determined tha t 
one t housand kilometers of r a ilway had to be repaired and 
that if this was done in three months time, a usable com-
munications net would exist . The first priority was given 
to the vital north-south link of the Tientsin-Pako.v road. 
On this line the r e were approximately .3 22 kilometers of the 
roa d destroyed, and four major breaks between Tientsin and 
Hwu-chow. Restoration of the Tientsin-Pakow road would give 
a boost to the economy of all eastern China. Teams were 
7
"Head ouarters Issue Order to Re s tore Communications," 
The Chungking Reporter, Vol II, No. 50, February 14, 1946. 
sent to strategic communic ation cent ers. Work was com-
menced on roads, bridges, locomotives, and telephone and 
telegraph lines by cooper a tion wi th the local military 
authorities and civilian magistrates. 
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Breaks in communic ations and t he a bility to coordinate 
actions between Communist and Nationalist factions, caused 
the repa triation of t h e Jap anese to be brough t to the at-
tention of the Three Commissioners. 8 .As days passed and the 
familiarity of the personnel with the problem grew, so did 
t he responsibility. This was crystalized on February 18 
when the Peiping Executive Headquarters r eceived Joint Com-
munique Number 13 from General Mac.Arthur's Far Eastern Head-
cuarte r s. This Communique outlined the responsibilities of 
the Truce Headquarters in conjunction with the United States 
Marines to receive, process, and ship the repatriates to 
Japan. It was also repeated, and amplified for implementa-
tion by General Directive Number 5, and agreed to and signed 
by t.he Three Commissioners of the Peiping Exe cutive Head-
quart ers . This directive stated that "the presence of large 
numbers of Japanese -is a disturbing factor in Nor t h China, 
whi ch makes the release of these Japanese from pre sent loca-
tions, and the ins urance of their orderly movem ent to ports 
of embarkation a matter of direct conc ern to Exe cutive Head-
quarters."9 The esti.rmted number of Japanese to be 
8 
"U .s. Gene ral on Repa tria t ionJ' . The Pei Qing Chronicle January 23, 1946. - __ , 
9History, Peiping Executive Head _uarters , loc. cit., 
Repa tria tion. 
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repatria ted was 120,000 military and 189,000 civilians. Two 
ports had facilities to accom.mooate them. These were Tangku 
and Tsing tao and it was planned to process 3,000 a day t hrough 
Tangku and 1,500 a day through Tsingtao. 
In the meantime reports of all t he field teams, though 
bright with hopes, wer e not entirely encouraging. 10 The ex-
pansion of the truce team system by the addition of railroad 
control light teams was so rapid that the Headquarters could 
list on February 20, a total of twenty-one teams, l a r ge and 
small, in the field. These reported many small conf lict s which 
were soon settled, some which were not settled, and others 
which we re for gotten. 11 The Puppet Troops, the name given to 
any bandit, guerrilla, armed group , partisan and non-partisan, 
began to enter and complicate t he already mixed up situation. 
In a given area someone would report a conflict. The parti-
cular Truce Team involved would at once drive to the scene of 
conf lict and more often than not find a full scale battle in 
progress. It was often most difficult to stop such engage-
ments. Even when it was stopped t he problem was only half 
solved. More than likely, one or t he other of t he Chinese 
representatives would make a statement about one of the com-
manders: "He is a Puppet Troop Commander!" he would say. 
"He was recognized when we were fighting the Japanese but now 
he is no longer recognized."12 In other words, the commander 
lO"Brigh t Hopes in China;' editorial New York Times, 
February 3, 1946, p. le. 
11 
"Conf lie ts Cease in Shans i, Hopei, and Sui Yuan," . 
The Chun&Sin~ Re2orter, Vol II, No. 48, J anua ry 31, 1946 . 
12
"Private Papers, Colonel W. C. Wils on, Fe bruary 9, 1946. 
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and his troops were fi gh ting for their own glory and booty. 
The .Arre rica n c hairman was thus in a dilemma. He had author-
ity to mediate between the Communists and the Nationalists 
only. So strictly speaking the Puppe t Troop Commander did 
not fall within his j ur isdi c ti on. In tim3 t his situa tion 
was corrected by an agreement of t he Three Commis s ioners 
tha t was issued on Fe bruary 10, 1946. 13 
.An incident which took place on the grounds of the 
Pek ing Union Medical College on February 20 was indi cative 
of events occuring all over China . .About t wo o'clock in 
the afternoon a large crowd of about 3,000 people bearing 
printed slogans began to push down the street to the Head-
quarters. They were orderly but insistent. Colonel W. C. 
Wilson was sitting in h i s office with Mr. Wayne 'l . Ling 
when the group literally swarmed over the for .ma l ga te and 
gate house. At the gate were two burley Chinese soldiers 
of the Nationalist Army, assisted by a Sergeant, and two 
equally formidable Comm.unis t soldiers. Colonel Wilson 
rushed to Mr. Bowen, the building .Administra tor, wh o s ug-
gested that they s ee General Tsai Weh-Chih , the Nationa l 
Government Chief of S taff and the man responsible for 
safety in the Thr ee Par ,ty He ad quarters. By the time 
General Tsai was on his feet and could see wbat was going 
on, t he la r ge crowd had passed t h e gate keepers and were 
all over the large courtyard. General Tsai went out on 
13
" Puppet Troops Included in the Cease Fir e Order," 
The Pei£inB Chronicle~ February 10, 1946. 
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on the p orch overlooking t he courtyard and t he crowd 
stopped milling and t al king. Se veral of the group came 
f d d d . d d 14 orwar an ma va rious eman s. First of all they 
wanted to see the Communis t Party Commissioner, General 
Yeh Chien-Ying; seconi ly, the wanted to be al lowed to re turn 
to t he ir homes safely; thi r dly, t hey wanted Comrnunis t troops 
to be evacuated from their villages; fourthly~ they asked 
that border district paper money be abolished, conscrip-
tion stopped, and finally tha t the liberated area governments 
be abolished. General Yeh came out on the porch and ad-
dressed t he t hrong. They listened with respect but after 
he ceased s peaking they stayed and p ushed into the halls 
of the Head ~uarters building where t hey silently occupied 
space arrl pre vented any work from going on. 
As Gen eral Tsai, the Nationalist Chief of Staff, 
ca.me back through t he door, Colonel VHJ.son asked: "How 
did you know t hat the peop le meant no har m, but only 
wanted to talk?" 
General Tsai though t a moment and replied: "They 
had fruit and peanut sellers with them. If they wer e in 
a dangerous .mood, they wouldn't h a ve had ti.me to eat and 
15 
the pe dlers wouldn't have co.me along." He advised that 
the Head quarters personnel continue with their work. When 
quitt ing time came t hey fil ed out as they norma lly did and 
The 
14 
"Demonstrators in Peiping Cal 1 on Comrnuni st Leade.r;tt 
Pei2inB Chronicle, February 22, 1946. 
15 
1946. 
Private Papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, Fe bruary 20, 
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paid no attention to the demonstrators . The l a tter in 
return wi t hdrew from. the area on t h eir own a ccord. That 
evening Colonel Wilson closed t he doors on the l as t of the 
protestors at about seven o'clock. 
The Americans in the Headquarters were surprised and 
annoyed by this demonstration and the lack of any effective 
means of controlling it . They demanded ap ologies. The 
Mayor of Pek ing did express his regrets, saying th at the 
people were refugees from. Hopeh Province and t ha t t hey had 
gotten out of hand . The very next day he s urround ed the 
buildings with th e local fire fi . ters, who looked very 
capable wi t h their f ire hoses, canvas aprons, and l a r g e 
brass he ad helmets . But no crowd arrived t ha t day, so the 
fire fighter s did not co me a gain. This was so typical of 
Chinese action. 
Vlhil e incl den ts such as t hose men tioned above were 
taking p l a ce in North China , Gener a l :Marshall and the 
Committee of Three continued to meet in Chunghing . Here 
the y considered problems which eventually were p assed on 
to the Executive He a d auarters for solution on local l e vels. 
One of t he knottiest of. t hese was t ha t the two independent 
armies in China - the Na ti onali s ts and the Communists -
were both f a ced with the pe rplexing oue s tion of Russ i a 's 
invasion of Manch uria and Nor th China dllr i n g t he l a st 
week of World War II. There shollld ha ve been no 
16 p roblems, howe ver, because in the Sino-Soviet Treaty 
whi ch was s i gned on .Augus t 14 , 1945, an accompanying 
note stated: "The Government of the USSR agrees to 
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rend er to China moral support and aid in mi l it ary supplies 
ar:d other ma terial resources, such support and aid to be 
enti re ly gi ven to t he National Gov er nm.ent a s t he centra l 
government of China."17 
But s uch was not th e case . .At t he end o f t he ifar, 
whe n Russ ian units departed from areas in Man churia, they 
did not perm i t any or gani zed Chinese units to enter the 
communiti es t h ey v a ca ted and t ake over the arms and muni-
t ions wh ich t hey had received on t he surrende r of the 
Japanese • 18 Q,ui te the c ontrary, th e Russi ans ham ed over 
Japanese arms to private citizens and bandit groups who 
soon became organized Communist uni ts. Then when the 
Kuoming t ang troops arrived on t he communications lines, 
after h a ving been ferr ied t he r e by United S t ates ai r tra ns -
par t, t hey found t hemselves faced by comp l e tely e auipped 
Communist troops. 
I n sp ite of t hese difficult circums t an ces, Genera l 
Marshall continue d to make prog ress. His a bility to fin::l 
practical solutions to diametrically oppo s ed vi ewpoints 19 
16
nchina and Her .Allies,tt . The Times (London), 
.A ug us t 2 8 , 19 4 5 , p • 5 • 
17u. s. Department of S tate, loc. cit., p. 117. 
18Ke nne th Scott Latourette, A His tor S:_ of Modern 
China, (Baltimore: Penguin Books , I954T p. 190. 
19 Lauterbach, 1££· cit., p . 311. 
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and, to make hi s opposite members of the Committ ee of 
Three recogniz e th ese solutions, led to an important 
accord on Fe bru ary 25, 1946. 20 Essentially it was a plan 
for unifi cation of the Communist Armies and the Na tional 
Go vernment Armies into one Nati onal Anny. 21 This announce-
men t was received with joy in t he field be cause t he agr6e-
ment gave promise to settle many armed clashes then in 
progress or about to break out. 
By t hi s time the U. S. Marines as well as the U.S. 
Anny had officers and soldi ers serving on the truce te ams. 
All te ams were ex ercising every known me t hod of influencing 
people and making them hold to the a greements t hat they 
had made. In some areas there were conflict s that had 
been go i ng on for a gen eration and other situa tions which 
the local officers could not resolve. The mass of evidence 
grew into such a proportion that the Three Commissioners 
in Peking prevailed on Gen eral Marshall, General Chou En-
lai, and Gen eral Chang Chun to visit their truce teams in 
the field. They also considered it desirablE for t hem to 
vi s it .n:ao Tse-tung in Yenan. They though t this would lend 
pres tig e and auth ority to tre field teams and better enable 
them to obtain workable solutions. Two days after the 
sining of the agreement to reorganize the Chinese Annies, 
General ].~arshall' s 054 .Air Force plane arrived a t We s t 
20 
U.S. Department of State, loo. cit., p. 140. 
21
"3 Man Military Committee Sig ns Agreemen tJ' The 
Ql:!ungk ing ReQor~~, Vol II, No . 52, Februa ry 28, 194b. 
52 
Field, Peking , bearing the Committee of Tl'iree on their 
visit ot ins_r:ection to five of the field tea.ms, and also 
to Yenan. 22 
A memorable e vent occured at five o'clock in the 
afternoon on February 27, when the Committee of Three met 
with the entire staff of t he Three Party Headquarters in 
the auditorium of the Peking Union Medical College. General 
Byroade introduced each Com.missioner to the group. He in 
turn introduced each member of the Committee of Three. 
Translations of both Chinese and English were msde and 
spoken as the sentences were finished. Noteworthy was 
General Chou En-lai 's hope that the Exe cu ti ve Head quarters 
would accomplish the mission assigned to it. "In all things 
I think it necessary that we first help ourselves and if 
we remain united th en all qu es ti ons may be solved with out 
too much difficulty," he said. 23 Then he added that all 
decisions reached by the National Gov E-rnmen t and the Com-
munist Party had to be carried out one hundred percent, in 
order to bring about necessary peace, democracy, and unity 
of China. 24 
General Marshall's speech was an appraisal of the sit-
uation as it existed. He th anked the members of the teams 
which were carrying out the dir ' Ctives and announced that 
---------------
22 
"Gener al s Chang, Chou and Marshall Leave for Peiping 
Today: The Chun~king Re2orter, Vol II, February 28, 1946. 
2 JH · t P . . E t. H d t is ory, e1p1ng xecu ive ea quar ers, 1££.:. 
ci~t First Q,uarter, Folder l. 
24Ibid. 
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one of t he major task s wou.ld be the u.nification of the 
armie s of China, and t he subsequent demob iliz at ion of 
several million troops. His closing remarks were an 
insp iration to all who heard them. "I am confident that 
the experience you. already have had with the daily in-
crease of yonr regard and respect for each other and your 
spirit of cooperation, th at this exceedingly import a nt and 
complicated task , will be carried ou.t with hi gh spirit, for 
the good of the Chinese _people and for the prosperity and 
dignity of China," he said. "Many individu.als will be 
called upon to make, what may seem to t bem at t r.tis time, 
great personal sacrifices. Some mu.st sacrifice, but I 
think the ma j ority will profit greatly. The prosperity 
of China is directly dependent upon your execution of this 
new mission. The prospeJ ity of China will mean the pro-
sperity and happiness of all Chinese. The tremendous re-
sources of China, t he i ndu.stry of its people, the demand 
of the world for China's produ.cts, all should combine to 
free the people from their present distress, and lif t China 
to its rightfu.l position among the nations of the world." 25 
Thereafter the Committ e e of Three continued on its 
round of visiting the field team locations and Yenan. 
General Marshall and his coworkers listened to team rep or ts 
passed on local problems, and ordered commanders to W)rk 
25
"Peiping Headquarters is Given Hig h Praise," The 
Pei,2in~ Cbronicle, March 2, 1946. -
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out solutions. Mos t of t he probl ems fell into three 
categorie s: (1) The 'cease fire', (2 ) t he repa triation 
of t he Jap anese, and ( 3 ) t he opening up of rai lroad and 
road c omm.unic at ions. 
At a g iven station, how e ver, a lmos t any k ind of 
prob lem would be pres ented. At Hs uch ow, in So uth China, 
for examp le, t he outstanding qu stion of t he day was t he 
ne ed f o r coal. So it was agr e ed th a t the Tsao Ch uan g 
Coal Mine, one of t he most pr oductive i n th e area, wo uld 
be opened. But the Chairman of Team No. 4, Colone l Donald 
Q. Harris, wh o was responsi bl e f or t hat area, s oon d i s -
cove red t h at agreements r eached on pape r were not so 
ea sily carried out in _pr actice. He was to expe rience 
numerous d ifficultie s before the mine was p ut in actual 
ope r a tion. 
At Hsin Hsian g on the Yellow Riv e r in Cm tral China, 
the pr i ncipal p roblem was the continua l f igh ting between 
th e Chines e Nationalist and Communist forces in t h e 
Menghs ien a r ea , a bout 18 .miles di s tant. In t h is cas e the 
National Gov ernment's 90th Division was gaining ground 
from the Com.m.unis t defenders. 
At t he conf er ence on March 3 in Yenan whe re Mao 
Tse-tung and Ch u Teh were present, Gener al Chou En-lai 
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told of t he a cc omp l i shmen ts of the Committee of Three • 
.Among the issues he discussed were (1) t bs necessity 
for f u r ther i mp le.rren tation and clari f ication of the 
'cease fire' ord er, ( 2 ) th e sta tus of beseiged forces 
whe t her t hey were ca lled p uppe ts or not, (3) t he raising 
of sieges of important towns and t he passing of food into 
t hem , and (4) the immediate r e storation of severed com-
munications. Out of t he meeti.qg came a directive from the 
Communist Heir archy ordering t ha t all sieges be lifted and 
t ha t food be allowed free and uninterrupted passage to 
26 i mportant towns • 
.A t Hue i S ui on March 3, 1 946 , the chair .rnan of 
Ra ilway Control Team 19 at .An Yung re ported t hat local 
Communist Par ty members would not per mit rail cons truction 
to begin. The Communists were objecting because, when 
repaired, th e ra i lways were used to transport National 
Government troops to fi gh t t he Communists. 
On March 6, th e inspection trip was comp l e ted. 
Though General Marshall had not seen all of the twenty-one 
light and hea vy t eams in the fi e ld, he was satisfied wi th 
t he solutions which military commander s had worked out 
loo ally, and he hop ed t h e political leaders would do as 
well . 
.After i nspecting th e field team, Gen eral Marshal 1 
26 
History, Peiping Exe cutive Head quarters , loo. cit • 
F ir s t 0,uarter, Fo ld er I. In t h is sour ce the r e are complet~ 
and ver batim records of wha t Mar shall and Chou En-lai said 
at Peking but unfortunately not for wha t was said a t Yenan. 
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and the Committee of Three returned to Chungk ing. Soon 
thereafter, he was recalled to the United States by 
President Truman to discuss financial and economic aid for 
China. 27 He depa rted on March 12, 1946, after effecting 
an agreement with the Committee of Three that the cease 
f . t ld 1 b ti ' ],,. ch · 28 T · ire ruce wou a so e opera ve in -.an uria. his 
was imperative because much hostility was engendered in 
China over the Russian occupation of Manchuria and their 
systematic destruction of ind us tries. Everything movable , 
including .machinery, do or sills, fixtur es, window frames, 
am the like, were t aken out of plants and shipped to 
Siberia. When the Russians finished dismantling a plant 
t he only thing they left wa s the bare walls • 
.At the ti.me of General Marshall's departure the number 
of field tea.ms had increased to twenty-five. These teams 
supervised an area of 700 by 900 miles. Progress was being 
.made and an air of confidence permeated the group. Much 
help had been obtained from the U. S . Marines . 2 9 There 
we r e eleven officers, one warrant officer, and eighteen 
.marines from. the III Amphibious Corps who were working on 
truce teams. When the Marine garrison of Peking was re-
duced to one battalion of Infantry and one battalion of 
.Artillery the Marines gave surplus trucks to the Peiping 
27 U. S. Department of State, loc. cit., p . 145. 
28Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 266 . 
29 John Hersey, "A M:arine in China;' 1lli, Vol XX , 
May 27 , 1946, p. 17. 
Head quarters to perform n ecessary haulage . They re-
linquished the Austrian and the Netherlands Legation 
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East Compound for future billeting needs. They gave up 
the Frazier Garage on Ha tamen S treet for a vehicle 
repair center. The confidence of the Military personnel 
of the Pei p ine: Head quarters was increased by the knowledge 
that the United States military forces had adapted the 
skills o:f their o:ffi c er s and men , hired ne cessary local 
help , and were doing a creditable job in bringing peace 
to China. 
On the eve of General Marshall's departure, Lieuten-
ant General Alven c. Gillem, Jr., United States Anny , 
assumed his duties in the meetings of the Committee of 
Three at Chungking. 
The high point of the success of the Marshall Mission 
was actually r eached at the t ime he left for the United 
States in March 1946. He had plans t o further augment 
the Executive He ad quarters and continue to sp read peace 
and reconstruct ion in Ch ina. 
But General Marshall was too optimistic. At that 
very moment the p olitical pendulum was beg inning to swing 
in Chungking back into its rea ctionary, righ test, Luoming-
tang contro lled domination, and the climate for peac e 
began to deteriorate. The Kuoming t ant Central Executive 
Committee had commenced mee ting in Chungking on March 1 
30 
and concluded its deliberat ions on March 17, 1946. 
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Even t hough Gener a liss imo Chiang Kai She k and t h e lib eral 
elemen ts in his Government wer e in favor of unific ation 
and a po litica l settlemen t wi t h the Communists, the in-
trenched conserva tives and r eactionaries, such as Chen 
Li, head of the Board of Organiza t i on of t he uoming tang , 
arrl his brother Chen Kuo-fu, member of the s tanding Com-
mit te e of t he I~uomi ng t ang Central Executive Committee 
since 1939, would not bud ge. 31 They interpre ted the 
growing t ens ion between the United St a tes and Rus sia as a 
s i tuation whi c h 'tJO uld c at1se the United States to Sllpport 
who le .he artedly t he Kuomingtang against the Commt1nis ts. 32 
When the Ruomi.ng tang Central Executive Committee adjot1rned, 
it had so am.ended t be original a gree.men t of the Politic al 
Consolut a tive Confe ~ence t ha t liberal and democratic ideas 
were submerged, Realizing this rett1rn to old positions, 
the Co.m.m.unists refused to participa te in the Na tional 
Ass em bly t ha t was scheduled to meet on May 15, Faced with 
t h is problem and hoping for a time ly compromise , the 
meeting of the National .Assembly was pos t poned to 
November 15, 1946. 
---------------
30u. s . Depa rtment of S t a te, loc. cit., p . 144. 
31John K. Fairbank, "Our Changes in China," . The 
Atlantic, Vol. 178 (Nov ember 3, 1946), p . 37: John 
Le i gh ton Stuart, loc. cit., p . 64 . 
32Tillman Durdin, "Key to Lasting Peace Seen in US-
Soviet Harmoney," New Yor k Times, February 10, 1946, p . 4. 
CFIAPTER VI 
TRUCE TEAM TEN 
The Commit tee of Three had agreed at Hs in Hsiang 
in Honan Prov inc e tba t t be Nationalist and Co.mm.unis t 
troops in the Menghsien area on the YellcwRiver should 
be separated and that Truce Team. Ten should supervise the 
operation. 1 The members of the Team at that time were, 
Colonel Huang Ching of the Communist Party, Lieutenant 
Colone 1 Tseng To-Tao, representing the Nationalist Govern-
ment , am Colone 1 Fes ley C. Wilson, the United States 
C.ba. irman. The interpreters were :Mr. Chen Su, United 
States, Jr. Yang P io, Communists, and Mr. Hwang Ti-thin, 
National Government. 
This chap ter will describe the general wor k of 
Truce Team Ten and the nature of the problems it faced 
in supporting the Marshall iission. The situation at 
Menghsien was crucial to the Communists because it con-
stituted a strategic position on the north bank of the 
Yellow iver in an area wh ich the famous Eighth Ro ute 
---------------
1History, Peiping Executive Head quarters, loc. cit.:_, 
First Q,uart er, Team Ten. 
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Army, commanded by General Chu Teh, had held many ye ars. 
For this reason a lone they had no i ntention of 1;ivi.ng up 
the area without a serious struggle. Tm Nationalist 90th 
Division commanded by Gene ral Yeh Li-chin, who had been a 
long time friend of the Genera lissimo and belie ved in living 
with h is soldiers and f igh ting. Before the armistice was 
sig ned on January 13, he had captured a beachhead on the 
north bank of the Yellow Riv er and was constantly expanding 
it. Nowiths tanding the armistice agreement. 
The road from Hsiu Wu and Hsin Hsiang to Chiao Tso , 
an important communications artery, also figured in the 
si tuation. Chiao Tso was the loc ation of a very important 
and productive soft coal mine which the Communists were 
o_r:erating . This .mine had been developed by a Bel gian firm 
and .made to function at full scale when the Jap anese con-
trolled the area . The Nationalists needed this coal, But 
the Communists created a no man ' s land jus t wes t of 1:siu 
Wu and would not let any traffic, civil ian or .military, 
cross it in sp ite of an ag reement I!l:l.de by Truce Team Ten 
early in the month of February . 
Before starting for Me nghsien the t eam was called 
upon to solve a minor problem in t he siege of Tung Men in 
Hopei Province. After so.me discussion between the Communist 
Commander who was besieging the town and the mem bers of 
Team Ten, the siege was lif ted enough to allow M:r. Henry 
W. S tokes of t he Friends Ambulance Uni t to carry food and 
AA F AeRo-.,au.t1c:.a/ Mop 
Shee.. t 38S-Lo R,ve~ 
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2 
medical supplies to that city. An additional problem 
was t ha t of a rranging a confe1e nc e with Gene ral Liu Chih, 
Na tional Government Troop Commander, am General Liu Po-
cheng, Communist Commander, on .April 4, 1946. These two 
offic er s were the senior troop command ers in the area. 
After this, on March 25, the Team set out to ac-
complish its primary mission on jeep and trailer and pro-
ceeded to Hsiu Wu. 3 This was a small tcwn by Chinese 
standards of about 15,000 inhabitants loc a ted approxirrately 
15 miles west, southwest of Hsin Hsiang. It was of 
strategic significance for the Nationalists because it 
was the last town on the r ai lroad in Nationalist held 
territory • .At Hsllu '/u a guide wa s furnished who took t he 
team to the vicinity of Ching Tun-tsLmg, a villa ge of 
about 2,500 people some five .miles sou th of Hs iu Wu. 
This was als o an a rea of sharp and constan,t conflict. 
The commander of the Nationalist Troops in the area had 
been a clever bandit l eader and he had his own force of 
about 12,00 men. They were a rough, capable lot and the 
rifles and sma ll arms they carried though motley r ep-
resented a formidable collection. The weapons had been 
made in the United States, Czechslovakia, Japan, and China. 
The Team interviewed the leader and talked wi t h some of 
2Inter view with Mr. Henry W. Stokes, March 23 , 1946. 
3History, Peiping Executive Headquart ers, loc. cit., 
First Q.uarter, Team Ten: "Sino AID3rican Fie ld Team to 
Menghsien," North China Daily News, Shanghai, March 28, 
1946, p. 5. 
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his men. The commander proudly explained that his men had 
captured their arms and the implications were that they 
intended to keep them. 
· At the conclusion of this visit the Team returned to 
the road from Hsiu Wu and began its journey to Chiao Tso. 
Along the way it was joined by a Communist patrol which 
emerged from the side of an abandoned railroad engine. 
This patrol escorted the Team. during the rest of the jour-
ney to Menghsieno The members of the patrol were mounted 
on stocky Mongolian Ponies that looked as though they had 
fought through many marauding campaigns. The party ar-
rived in Chiao Tso at nightfall. It was a city of about 
50,000 people five miles inside the Communist lines. The 
local magistrate greeted the team with normal Chinese 
courtesy and quartered them in one of the houses originally 
occupied by the Be~gian engineers of the Li-feng Mine.4 
During the night a heavy rain commenced falling. It 
continued in the morning, making travel practically impos-
•Sible, so the team decided to remain where they were for 
the day. This was the signal for the magistrate and the 
Co~ unist representative, Colonel Huang, to bring in dele-
gations of various groups within the city. This was the 
Communist way of trying to impress the truce team with the 
~ffect their type of government had on the people. Each 
delegation had a leader who always gave a speecho 
4Private Papers, Colonel W. c. Wilson, March 26, 1946. 
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The theme of his discourse was invariably progress, or 
democracy, or brotherhood, or a similar subject. 
Later on during the afternoon, in spite of the 
rain, the shaft and the buildings of the mine were 
inspected by the members of the team. The operation 
was proceeding just as fast as the elevator could bring 
up loads of coal in the huge mine bucket. The manager, 
who had previously worked for the Belgians and the Jap-
anese, said that none of tra equipment was safe but that 
he had to keep the coal coming up to the surface. Stock 
piles of coal were standing in the yard. The favorite 
means to haul it away was by bull or donkey cart and the 
hand pushed wheelbarrow. 
The next day the rain continued. Nevertheless, the 
team moved out on the muddy road and with a squad of 
Communist Cavalry accompanying, slowly pushed toward 
Po Si where a branch of the Yellow River was crossed. 
Early in the afternoon tbe jeep with its trailer became 
stuck in the road where it traversed an embankment of a 
river. When Colonel Wilson, who was driving, started to 
get out, Colonel Huang held his shoulder and indicated 
that he should not alight. The Colonel called the Cor-
poral of the soldier escort over and spoke a few words. 
The Corporal rode off. Ten minutes later he returned 
with about sixty peasant farmers. These crowded around 
the jeep and trailer with its cargo of Truce Team members 
and their baggage and pushed the whole along the road in 
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the ank l e deep mud. Reaching t he wo oden bridge t he l abor-
ers swung t he load around until it was firmly s e t and was 
a ble to pr oceed und er its ovm power.5 
Tha t night the group st ayed in a private home and 
t he on ly vis i tors were a Ca tholic priest and hi s t wo he l -
pers, n uns from the town of Chin Yang a short dist ance 
away. The prie s t was Austrian and one of the nuns was an 
American. The other wa s a Chinese lady. They were part 
of Bishop Arthur Me eghan' s group loca ted a t Hs in Hs i ang . 
They bro ugh t a pint of milk and stayed and dr ank Govern-
me n t i s sue co f fee with sugar. Their conv er sa tion with 
truc e te am members shed interesting light on loc a l con-
ditions. The problem of ade qua te care of t he s ick , t hey 
s a id, wa s overwhe l ming. The Communists allowed them to 
c arry on t he ir hospita l work bec ause t her e we r e no other 
doctors or nurses in t he en tir e ar ea . Communi s t officers 
brough t t he i r own wives and mothers to be trea t ed in the 
h os pit al and t hough they would not help to support t he 
enter pri se, they at least did not hinder it s work. 
The nex t day was March 28 and t he journey continued. 6 
By now the r a in had stopped . The character of the roadbed 
and t he s urrounding terrain had changed to gra vel and t his 
made trave l easier. About t wo o'c l ock in t he afternoon 
t he te am arrived a t Menghs ien where it was installed in a 
5~. 
6rbid. 
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small f arm ho use with a walled enclosure. The Truce t eam 
was visited by several delegations. Lt. Colonel Tseng, 
t he Nationa li s t representative, occasionally asked a ques-
tion. ~hen he did, the person he asked would become excited 
and l a unc h i n to a tirade. v;ha t was usually said in the 
tirade was tha t t he area had been und er t he con trol of a 
Nationalist Tyrant named Jon Fa Gue who murdered, r aped, 
shot, hung, and generally har assed good trades peop le and 
f a rmers. 
The next morning members of the Truce Team mounted 
staunch Mongo lian ponies and surveyed t he Communist posi-
tion. With Batt a lion Commander s and Regimental Commanders 
showing t he way, they wound in and out among the small 
hil ls and mounds wh ich dotted the area. Soldiers occupied 
slight ho les, depre s sions , places i n house roofs, trees , 
and were s o well worked into the loc a l ground it was dif fi-
cult to det er mine whether t here were t hree t ho us and or 
t hir ty thousand men defending the lines. This was in 
decided contras t to posi tions occupied by Na tionali s t 
troops , whic h the team inspected l a ter. Communist pos i-
tions were tra versed from t he north bank of t he Ye llow 
Ri ve r near Kan Ko Shoto Lan Ke Tao, a distance of about 
fifteen miles. _ t several village s tha t t he team rode 
t hrough , the peop l e came out en masse to greet t hem with 
rice wine, cooked f ood, flowers, and speeches. The Commun-
ist member exp lained t ha t t his was t he trea tment accorded 
t o digni t aries. He furt her explained t hat t he Communists 
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used guerilla met hods exclusively bec a use their army was 
used to tra veling and fighting in the mountains. In the 
early d ays of the 4' ighth Route .A rmy, the numbers of Commu-
ni s ts was so small that the squad leaders developed a 
system of forcing half a dozen farmers' sons to go with 
them on their r a ids. When the action was completed, the 
impressed men were allowed to return home. 
As the team worked its way from hid den position to 
hidden _position, on the Communist side, the National 
Government's system of field fortifications was clearly 
vi s ible in the distance. Whereas it wa s very difficult 
to tra ce the positions of the Communist force s , the 
Nationa l Government's were a s clear as day. Without attempt 
a t camouflage they occupied large dirt blockhouses, pill-
boxes, communication and fighting trenches. No firing 
occurred at any time during the inspection tour. By night-
fall the tired team returned to Menghsien for a well 
deserved sleep . 
The morning hours of March 30 were spent interviewing 
delega tes and witnesses from the farmers cooperativ e , the 
workmans le ague, the governor's office and the middle 
school re presentatives. It was apparent tha t there were 
very few old people in the groups. However, hundreds of 
thumb prin,ted petitions were given the team for the team to 
bring peace, prasperity and happiness to the populace. One 
old man in a warm grey gown and wool stocking cap appeared 
clutching the Saint James Version of the Bible under his 
arm. He obviously was fright ened. He recited a few lines 
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tha t he had learned and was relieved when the word s were 
finished. Colonel Tseng asked a f ew questions. The old 
man would start to answer, fumble and run out of words . 
Something occurred during the meeting whic h forced t he 
.American chairman to depart. .After a f ev, a tte.mp t s to 
question wi tnesses t he session became a three way argument 
between t he Communist member, Colonel Huang , his witne ss , 
and the Nationalis t member , Lt. Colonel Tseng. In t he end 
Colonel Tseng accused the witness of lying and Colonel Hwang 
was outraged . 
In t he aft ernoon, af t er s aying _goodbye to Liu Po 
Ch un's repres ent a tive, t he t eam mounted t he j eep and rode 
into t he Nat ionalis t lines a t Chi-li. The Commander of 
the 90th Division, Genera l Yeh, held a dinner for Colonel 
Wilson rnd t he members of the te am .7 For seven months 
during World War II Colone l ~i lson had been an instructor 
in Inf antry technique and small unit tactic s with t his . same 
division in a little community cal led Ho Nan , 40 miles 
west of Si an, China, and made friends wi th many of its 
officers . t t he testimonial dinner, Genera l Yeh voi ced 
t he opinion of many Chinese dignitaries a t th a t time . "I 
do not under stand the United State s of America," he said. 
"In 1945 t hey send Co l onel \ ilson into the middle of China 
and he teaches us how to fi gh t t he Japanese and Communists 
so we can win . Then in 1946 t hey send Colone l Wilson back 
to us to say, 'You can't fight; you must ha ve peace. You 
7 i s tory, Pei oing Executive Head quar ters , loo.cit., 
Team Ten, Folder IV. 
must give up all you have won'"· 
t he dinner went on.B 
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ith tha t he s a t down and 
In the morning more ponies a ppeared and t he long trek 
be gan along the Na tional ist lines . s indicated pre v ious]y , 
t hese were plainly visible, being of the trench warfare 
type. They ex tended from Po-To on t he Yellow River, 
through Tsung-Yuan, I-Ko, Chian-Tung, Yen Shenhsin-Cheng and 
thence to Dien-Chiang on the eas tern boundary, a distance 
of about twelve miles. By nightfa ll the team had comp leted 
the circuit of t h e whole position. It wa s p l otted and a 
stormy session began be tween the Co~.munist a nd t he Na tion-
alist members of Team Ten. Neither Colonel Tseng or 
Colonel Huang wanted to trace t he ir respective positions 
on a map. After a long and acrimonious debate they fin-
ally agreed on the area and the botmd aries which would 
be p lotted on t he ma_ . J fter more bitter discussion, 
Colonel Huang of the Communists reluctantly agreed to an 
armistice with free interchange of travel between the 
Communists and Na tionalists on the main route along the 
Yellow River which passes through Chi-li. 
The armistice reached at Menghsien was considered 
by the Executive Headquarters as a major achievbment. 
Until this time the Communists had been able to justify 
any reported atta cks they made throughout China by point-
ing to a definite attack that the Nationalists made in 
t he Menghsien area. The members of Team Ten felt proud 
8Priv a te Papers, Co l onel W. C. Wilson, 30 March 1946. 
70 
and happy. Colonel Huang seemed to be satisfied and Lt. 
Colonel Tseng resigned to t he solution. 
11th the armistice r ecognized and t he position mapped, 
Team Ten crossed the Yellow River t he nex t day on an 
ancient boa t manned by twenty-four men poling it wi th the 
current. The arriva l on t he south bank of t he river 
brough t t he jeep to a ro ad which led into Kai-feng. The 
Lung Ha i Railroad was in opera tion so the jeep and trailer, 
te am and interpreters proceeded on flat cars and coaches 
to ai-feng. After dinner a t the headquarters of General 
Liu Chih in Kai-feng and again in Chengshien, t he team 
arrived back a t Hs ing Hsiang on April 2.9 One of the 
stories which was told the chairman of the team was t ha t 
Genera l Liu Po Chung, the Communist and Genera l Liu Chih, 
t he Na tiona lis t, were more than mortal enemies and no 
reconciliation would ever be possible. The enmity went 
back to a period a bout t hirteen years before, when Liu 
Chih was a regi mental commander. He had a r emote ba tta l i on 
he avily engaged i n fi gh ting t he Communists. He s en t Liu 
Po Chun out to direct the fighting . The next report he 
received was t ha t his assistant had t aken over the command 
of the ba tta lion and directed it s fi ghting all right, but 
was fight ing as a Communist and had taken the soldiers and 
off i cers wi th him. 
Whatever the reason, when the meeting of the field 
team. and t he commanders of the troops in the Esin Hs i ang 
9History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, Team Ten, 
Folder IV. 
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area was held, both commanders sent their Chief's of S t aff 
to the conference. Being the host area, the Nationalist 
displayed a map on which their boundaries were shown. Then 
the Communists presented a map with their boundaries indi-
cated. At no single point did t he ma ps agree. In an 
attemp t to reconcile the cla im and counter claim, it became 
a pparent to the team that except for the agreement at 
Menghsien, the maps just had a t wenty mile band of over-
lapping territory which both sides maint a ined they occupied. 
A plan of reconnoitering was worked out and approved. 
One concrete proposal was made and accepted. The 
Communists agreed to set up a coal purchasing st a tion at 
Chiao-Tso for the Nationalists to come in a nd buy coal for 
cash. 10 
There were two sequels to this activity of Team 10, 
and both are indicative of the climate of the truce effort. 
There were approx imately 18,000 Communists fi ghting 
20,000 Nationalists in the vicinity of Menghsien. It was 
vital to the Communists to contain the adva nce of the 
Nationalists bec a use this was the home area of the whole 
Communist effort. When the truce agreement was affected 
which brought so much joy to the American Headquarters, 
the Communists withdrew their tactical units, but replaced 
them with Home Pacification units on the indicated posi-
tions, and marched on foot the t actical fighting units 
over mountain tra ils and ba ck roads, and threw them 
lOibid. 
-
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against the Nationalist New 6th Army at Sze Ping Kai in 
Manchuria several months later. 11 This was the sort of 
treachery that doomed the whole Marshall Mission. 
The coal post at Chiao Tso could be the basis for a 
Gilbert and Sullivan opera. After much negotiation it was 
agreed that a bipartisan station would be installed there 
and coal purchased by the Nationalists for cash. 
A bull cart train was assembled and in October made 
one complete trip between Chiao Tso and Hsing Hsiang. The 
American chairman at the tine went with tbe train and 
escorted it through both opposing lines and a cross the 
no man's land. He noticed and reported tmt as he passed 
through Hsiu Wu thousands of Nationalist Government troops 
were moving through the town. 12 Two days later, it was 
reported tbat the Nationalist troops jumped off in an 
attack and occupied Menghsien; Kwi-leh; Po Ai and Chiao Tso. 
On October 13, the Communists officially protested 
at tbe Peiping Executive Headquarters. They also, in con-
versation, accused tbe American Chairman of Team. Number 
Ten of being a spy for the Nationalists in that he was the 
negotiator for the coal post at Chiao Tso. 
The foregoing incidents are indicative of the highly 
antagonistic situation in every field of Chinese living 
11
"Red Activities Cause Anxiety," The Peieing Chronicle, 
July 7, 1946. 
12History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
Team Ten Folder IV. 
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and politics. The fight for power was intense between the 
Kuomintang Government led by the Generalissimo, and the 
Communist Party led by Mao Tse Tung. In spite of the pro-
fessed desire of the leaders to agree and live in harmony, 
tbe rank and file were so imbued with fighting to t.re last 
man for the party they were affiliated with that peace 
and harmony was impossible. The best comparison to be 
made was that China was a small bone and two big dogs 
wanted it. There was not enough for two to have. The 
experiences of Truce Team Ten were similar to those of the 
other Truce Teams of the Marshall Mission. 
CH PTrR VII 
CONFLICT AND REPATRIATION 
General Marshall returned to China on April 18, 1946, 
with his wife and found tha t the situation had changed 
greatly during his absence. 1 While in the States he had 
arranged with the United States War Department to use a 
hundred more senior Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels in 
jobs he thought were necessary for the success of his 
mi s sion. But on April 15, just three days prior to his 
arrival, General Chou En-lai had announced a sta te of open 
hostilities in Manchuria . 2 The possibility of such an 
outbreak had been apparent to the personnel of the Exe-
cutive Headquarters for some time. On March 28, General 
Byroade flew to Mukden to prepare for the arrival of four 
field teams. 
The National Government and Americ an represent a tives 
arrived in Mukden on March 30 and the Communist members on 
April 2. Colonel Raymond Tourtillot was the senior Amer-
ican while the Nationalist represent a tive was Major General 
~ayling Soong Chiang , "China," Enc,Y:clo£eQ_ia 
Britannica, Ten Eventful Years, Co l . I, 1947, p . 055. 
2Kenneth Scott Latourette, !...~!stori of Modern China ; 
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 195~, p: 195. 
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Tsai Tsung-lien and the Communist Par ty representative, 
Lt. General Yao Shu-shih. One team of the four was to be 
the senior and remain at Mukden for the purpose of main-
t aining communication and forwarding suppl ies. The other 
three teams we r e to ga ther informa tion, i mp l ement general 
and spe cial directives, and enforce 'cease fire' direct i ves. 
The first team dispatched was Team 29 with twelv e Na tional 
Government officers, eight Communist officers and six 
Americans under Lieutenant Colonel Robert S . Drake, United 
S t a t es Army, a telephone eng ineer f r om Pennsylvania who 
had been in the Burma campai gn during World War II. This 
team was to und ergo a variety of experiences similar to 
those already told concerning Team 10 a t Hs in Hsi ang . 
They have been vividly described by Richard E. Lauterbach 
who accompanied the te am and lived with it on this mission.3 
As previously indicated in Chapter V, the acting 
Committee of Three functioned in General Marshall's behalf 
during his absence. The Committee, composed of U. s . Army 
General Gillem, Na tionalist General Tsai Tsung-lien and 
the Communist Par ty General Yao Shu-shih, continued to hold 
meetings in Chungking, the sea t of the Nationalist Govern-
ment. The most important problems they dis cussed in the 
period i mmediately art er General Marshall's departure were 
3Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 282. 
the reorganization of the Chinese Armies and r a ilroad 
reconstruction.4 
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The l a tter led to acrimonious debate and ended in a 
virtual deadlock . To break the d ead lock the Committee of 
Three decided to go to Peking, t he rail ne twork of North 
China and hub of the transporta tion problem. There t hey 
met at a dinner on March JO, given by Genera l Li Tsung-jen, 
who was later to become the Vice-President of the Na tion-
alist Government. Though the atmosphere was congenial, 
the discussions ended in another draw with each side 
a ccusing the other of f a ilure to remo ve fortific a tions and 
block houses which were all along t he railroa d line s in 
North China. 
In the meantime the situation in Manc huri a became so 
critical tha t the acting Committee of Three flew to Mukden 
on March 31 to ob serve the situa tion there . They remained 
for one day d uring which time t hey visited the Na tionalist 
Commander, Tu Li- Ming , wh o briefed t hem on the problems 
in his area.5 The next day they returned to Chungking . 
After they arrived there , reports continued to come in 
concerning the fighting in the Sze- pin-Kai area of Man-
churia where the New Sixth .Army and the New First .A r my 
were engaged with the Communists. Farther north a t 
4
"Reds Want Marshall Back a s .Arbiter," North China 
Da~ll New~ (Shanghai), March 30, 1946. 
5History, Pei ping Executive Headquar ters, loc. cit., 
2d Quarter, Fo lder 1. 
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Changchun, the old capi tol of Manchukuo, the Na tiona list 
troops had taken over t he city and capitol, only to be 
thrown out by the Communist forces. The latter had also 
occupied ar ea s wes t of Mukd en. 
The day that General Marshal l arrived in China , the 
new 'Sixth Army moved back into Changchun. This Stilwell 
tra ined force, under the leadership of General Liao was 
proving a match for whatever troops the Communists pressed 
into action against them. 
When General and Mrs. Marshall arrived a t Peking on 
April 18, they were house guests of t he Walter Robertson's 
a t the American Embassy. After an overnight visit they 
returned to Chungking. Here the Committee of Three met 
with General Marshall and conv ers a tions were immedia tely 
resumed with the Generalissimo to patch up the deterior-
ating situation. 6 No agreemen t was reac hed and conse-
quently h@ positive action was taken. Shortly thereafter, 
Chiang Kai Shek took a step which revealed his obstinacy 
in the whole China issue. On May l, 1946, he moved his 
Nationalist Government from Chungking to Nanking . He did 
this in spite of the fact he knew that such a gesture 
would be strongly opposed by the Communists. It was their 
contention that the Communist Party rightly represented 
the three principles of Sun Yat-sen (people's na tionalism, 
people's democracy, and people's livelihood) and not the 
---------------
6
"Six Hour Meeting No Result," North China Dai_bl 
~~ (Shanghai), March 27, 1946. 
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nationalists. The Communis ts d id not want to s ee Chia ng 
and t he Kuomi ng t ang claiming Sun Yat -sen' s heritage in 
the city which cont ains his s hrine.7 
With each passing day conditions went from bad to 
worse. General ~arshall issued hi s first statement since 
his r eturn to China on May 23. It char acterized the period 
as follows: 
"Genera l Marshall is daily engaged in discuss ions 
with repres en t a tives of Chinese political parties and 
others conce rning t he re s tora tion of peace in Manchuria. 
He is deeply concerned over the critical situation in 
North China and is ende a vor ing by every means within his 
power to avoid the spread of t he figh ting in Manchuria to 
t his r egion. The present publicity or propaganda cam-
paign conducted by both sides na tura lly infla.rre s f eelings 
and increases the possibility of some hot-head precipi-
t a ting a genera l conflagr a tion. This reck less propaganda 
of ha te a nd suspicion seriously aggravates the present 
serious situation and can lead to results tha t would be 
disastrous for the pe ople of China. 
"Opera tion of truce teams has been made especially 
difficult by t he s preading of propaganda among the officers 
and soldiers of both sides, and it is on the success of 
these teams that China must large ly depend for the effort 
at least to loc a lize, if not suppress conflict. The Ame ri-
c an members of t he team are coping with condit ions t ha t 
involve , not only hardship , but risk ing of t he ir lives in 
a determined and impartial effort to better the situation ."8 
Despite General Marshall's vigorous efforts, team 
chair men f aced hardened members and angry problems every-
where they were sent. In an effort to alleviate th e 
situation, Chiang Ka i Shek ordered the Na tionalist forces 
to 'cease fire' on June 6, 1946. This originally was to 
7History, Peip ing Exe cutive Headquarters, loo. cit., 
Se cond ~uarter, Folder I. 
8u. s . Department of State, loc. cit., p. 648. 
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last for fifteen days but the time was extended to 
June 30, 1946.9 No similar prono uncement was made by the 
Communists. Howe ver Chiang Kai Shek made this ges ture 
with ulterior motives in view. He was willing to coopera te 
to a point bec ause t he United Sta te s S t a te De_p3.rtment had 
announced t hat American mili t ary a id would go to China if 
and when the Kuomingtang and Communis t rmies were united. 
Nevertheless Chiang Kai Shek 's step aroused new hope 
and the field teams assigned to Manchuria wer e eager to 
set to work . On June 6, General Byroade moved the subor-
dinate headquarters to Changchun and there est ab lished an 
advanced section of the Peiping Executive Headquart ers in 
the Chinese Eastern Railroad Building. This group was 
responsible for eight teams which were dispa tched to wide-
spread locations in Manchuria. These were: 
Team 27 
Team 28 
Team 29 
Team 30 
Team 33 
Team 34 
Team 35 
Team 36 
Mukden 
Sze Ping Kai 
Hailung 
Haicheng 
La Fa Chen 
Tehui 
Harbin 
Tsitsihar 
All had varied and strange experiences. Some per-
formed yeoman service, some scarcely functioned, and one, 
not at all. 
Take the case of Team 35 scheduled for the Harbin 
area . On the military front, the Sungari River became 
9"15 Day Truce Ex tended Ei gh t Days to June 30," 
The PeiEin8 Chronicle, June 23, 1946. 
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the dividing line between the two military forces,10 and 
because Team 35 was to work in a sensitive region under 
Communist control, the Senior Communist Comma nder of the 
forces in Manchuria never let it function. 
Team Number 33 also found itself in the vise of 
opposing Chine se forces. It was assigned to La Fa Chen, 
an importa nt railway junction. The city, whose population 
numbered about 30,000, was also located on the eastern 
flank which was just beyond the extent of the Nationalist 
advance. 
On the day the Na tiona list truc e was announced, the 
advance guard of the ad vancing troops was overwhelmed and 
t hrown back to Lao Yeh Ling Pass by an aggress ive Communist 
force in sup er i or positions. 
In s pite of the bitter fighting and the complete 
destruction of the railroad, the flow of Japanese r epat-
ri a tes continued. They were gathered up by the Communists, 
assembled in groups of from 500 to 1,000 and moved by 
train to the edge of the town of La Fa Chen, which had been 
an important railroad junction. 11 There they spent the 
nigh t sleeping in the open fields. In the morning they 
trudged on, men, women, and children, with all t h ey could 
carry . (and the Chinese would allow), including cooking 
lO"Neutra l Zones for Northeast," The Pei,2ins Chroni~, 
Aug ust 2, 1946, p. l. 
11Priva te papers, Colonel W. C. Wilson, September 11, 
1946. 
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pots, wood for fuel, a few boards to make coffins, and 
some food - across the twelve mile no man's land to the 
Nationalist controlled area. There open flat cars or 
coal cars were standing on the railroad tracks. These the 
people mounted, erected barriers of sorts, and journeyed 
on to Changchun. A bigger camp was in operation there. 
The Japanese completely cared for themselves. Each detach-
ment of one hundred had a middle-aged man as a leader. 
Usually a small boy walked alongside him with a flag 
de s i gna ting the group. The group was so self sufficient 
that every contingency of living and dying was handled as 
it arose. 
Officers of the Communist Army and officers of the 
Na tionalist Ar my were on hand at various junction points 
to see that the movements continued without unnecessary 
delays. This was one of the most unique situations United 
States Field Teams met with in China. Surprising as it 
may seem, both sid e s refrained from fighting in the vici-
nity of J apanese repatriates. This proved at least two 
things - (1) both sides wanted to rid China of the Japanese, 
and (2) they could and would cooperate if they felt they 
could reap some particular advantage from mutual cooper-
ation . Thus it was that U. s . Truce Teams were able to 
help speed the Japanese back to their homeland . As 
repatriation was one of the most successful accomplish-
ments in China during the period of the Mars.hall Mission, 
it is well to examine the magnitude of the task that was 
achieved in this field of U. s. Truce Team activity. 
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The shipping ports for Japanese repatriates were 
Tsing tao and Tangku in North China and Hulutao in Man-
churia.12 During the week of April 13 to 19, 22,620 
Japanese had been processed through Tangku and 2,942 
through Tsingtao. During the week May 7 to 15, 29,535 
were sent through Hulutao. Four ports of entry received 
them in Japan. These were Sasebo, Kagoshima, Hakota and 
Kure. As a matter of interest, the first Japanese ship 
assigned to this work was the "Enoshima Maru."13 There-
after, various other Japanese ships, U. s. Navy LST's and 
Liberty Ships were made available. In . addition to the 
well and able-bodied, it is estimated that 70,000 sick and 
wounded were moved. The repatriation in North China was 
completed on August 11, 1946, with the processing of 1,246 
Japanese from Tangku. Under the auspices of the Executive 
Headquarters, Colonel Paul G. Bell negotiated an agreement 
between Major General Liu Chu-yih, Chief of the Japanese -. 
Civilian and Prisoner of War Administration, National 
Government North East Headquarters, and General Li Li San, 
Chief of Repara tions for the Communist Party at Harbin, 
Manch uria. This agreement insured the uninterrupted flow 
of repatriates from Communist to Nationalist territories. 
The repatriation team at Hulutao processed numbers 
of repatria tes which are amazing in size considering the 
12History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loo. cit., 
Quarter II, Repatriation. 
lJ"Splendid Feat by USN Freighters,~ North China 
Dail.z News, (Shanghai) Vol. CXXXXVII, January 24, I945, p. l. 
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multitude of problems that were encountered. Throughout 
the summer of 1946 a steadily incre asing number of persons 
were proc essed until on September 24 a peak load of 23,580 
was reached. From the day repatriation started in Manchuria 
un til July 31, a total of 441,349 persons were processed 
of which 432,321 were civilian and 9,028 military. By 
Sep temb er 15, the number had grown until a total of 
685,836 were processed of which 675,251 were civilia n and 
9 ,575 were military. 
A small but no less importan t U.S. Ar my s ection 
had the mission of helping to repa tria te the Japanese in 
Formosa. During the period November 4, 1946, to January 4, 
1947, there were 16,889 Japanese s hipped to the homeland; 
7,351 Okinawans; and 3 Koreans. 
In the final report of the Communic a tions Group of 
t he Executive Headquarters a recapitulation of the Repat-
riation Mi s sion is given. It shows the vast number of 
peop le that were shipped out of China during 1946. 
Japane se military personnel 
Japanese civilians 
Koreans 
Okinawans 
Indonesians 
Filipinos 
Grand Tot a l 
1,241,296 
li776,272 
3,017,575 
61,371 
15,407 
95 
29 
3,094,47714 
President Truman summarized the huge task in a 
statement he mad e on United States Policy toward China on 
14History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
~uarter IV, Repatriation. 
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December 18, 1946. "American forces helped in t he dis arm-
ament of' J ap anese units. Executive Headquart ers and its 
truce teams were able to make the complicated arrange.roo nts 
necessa ry to tran s f' er J apanese a cro ss lines and through 
a r eas involved in civil conflict on their way to ports 
of embarka tion. American unit s a lso pa rticipated in the 
inspection at the port. American medical unit s supervis ed 
all inocula t i on and other medical work . Finally, American 
and Jap anese ships, under the control of General MacArth ur 
in Japan, and a number of United S t a tes Navy ships under 
the Seventh Fleet, tr ansported this number of persons to 
rec eption por t s in Japan.«15 
When General Marshall came to China as President 
Truman's personal representative he did far .more than 
negotiate between the Chinese Nationalists and the Commun-
ists. He al s o assumed the res ponsibilities of Ambas sador 
Hurley who had re s igned his position on November 27, 1945. 
However, the peace offensive was tottering so badly on its 
political and military supports tha t on July 11, 1946, the 
President nominated and the United States Senate confirmed : 
the appointment of John Leighton Stuart as mbassador to 
China. 16 No one was better qualified to act as an impar-
tial represent a tive and supporter of the United S tates' 
1 5u. s. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 693. 
16
"Chou En-lai on U. S. Envoy," The Pei 2in~ Chronicle, 
August 6, 1946, p. l. 
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peaceful desires than Doctor Stuart. He had lived in China 
many years and knew the country and the people thoroughly. 
He was just retiring from the Presidency of Yenching Univ-
ersity in Peking, an institution he had founded in 1919. 
His name had been submitted to President Truman by General 
Marshall, who found in him the ideal man for the job. "I 
took this action because of Doctor Stuart's fifty odd years 
experience in China and his character, his personality, 
and his temperament," General Marshall later wrote in the 
preface of Dr. Stuart's book . "With Doctor Stuart beside 
me, I had more than fifty years of vast experience unpre-
judiced by personal involvements in Chinese partisanship. 
On his appointment, I found his advice and leading assist-
ance of invaluable help to me. I doubt if there is anyone 
whose underst anding of Chinese character, history, and 
political complications equals that of Doctor Stuart. 
His high standard of integrity made his opinions all the 
more important.n1 7 
General Marshall had need of all the support Doctor 
Stuart was capable of giving. Events were sh~ping up which 
had no answers and suggested no solutions. In the course 
of time United States personnel were deliberately and 
brutally maltreated. Although there was only one shooting 
affair,it was serious and tragic. It took place on 
July 29 when a band of uniformed soldiers in the vicinity 
17John Leighton Stuart, Fiftl Years in China (New York: 
Ra ndom House, 1954), p. ix. 
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of Peip i ng ambushed a United Sta tes Marine convoy on the 
road at Anpi ng . The Marines were escorting a supp ly 
convoy to Peiping . The skirmish lasted four hours and 
during the firing one officer and two enlisted Marines 
were killed, four were s eriously wounded and eight suf-
fered minor wounds. 18 
On the f i rst of August Mr. Robertson wired the 
Committee of Three for permission to investiga te. The 
permission was granted but no impartial investiga tion was 
ever made. The Three Commi s sioners wrangled over the sub-
ject until September JO. nThis was not only a blow at the 
American military personnel, the attack had the appe ar ance 
of an attempt to discredit the activities of Executive 
Headquarters in the United States and to cause the whole 
Marshall Mission to lose face in China, and a logical 
follow t hrough of the current propaganda campaign," says 
t he official History of the Peiping Executi ve Headquarters . 19 
This ev ent undoubtedly influenced the United S t a t es 
in withdrawing many of its Marines who had been protecting 
the great coal mines east of Tientsin and the passage of 
the coal from the mines to the sea where it was tran-
shipped for the railroads and cities of central China. 20 
18
"Marine Killed, Wounded Listed," The Pei12ins 
Chronicle , August 1, 1946, p. 1. 
19History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
2d Quarter, Folder I . 
20u. s . Department of State, O£. c_lt., p. 175. 
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Anyone without a first-hand acquaintance with China could 
not possibly appreciate the importance of the work which 
the United S tates Mariaes performed in the Tientsin area. 
This was because coal possesses a value in China out of 
all proportion to its va lue in the United St a tes. Con-
sider the fact that unless t wo vigilant men armed with 
guns and orders to shoot did not ride each coal car from 
the loading station to its final destination the local 
inhabit ants would steal every chunk of coal enroute. 
The Joint Communique issued by General Marshall and 
Doctor Leighton Stuart on August 10 bespoke the growing 
seriousness of the situation in China. 21 It pointed out 
t hat they had been exploring every possibility of termin-
ating the growing conflict between the Nationalists and 
the Communists and the initiation of preliminary steps in 
the development of a truly democratic government. "The 
desire for a peaceful solution of political problems 
a ppears practically unanimous on the part of the people, n 
read the communique . "The economic situation demands 
prompt solution if disastrous collapse is to be avoided. 
"Figh ting, daily growing more widespread, threatens 
to engulf the country beyond the control of those respon-
sible. Government and Communist leaders are anxious to 
put an end to the fighting, but there are certain issues 
concerned in the immedia te settle.rent involved regarding 
21u. s. Departmen t of S tate, op. cit . , p. 175. 
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which agreements have not been found. It appears imposs-
ible for t he t wo parties to re ach a settlement of those 
issues which will permit a general order to be iss ued for 
the complete cessation of hostilities in all China. 
"Certain of the unsettled issues relate to the mili-
tary redisposition of troops. However, these apparently 
present less difficulty for settlement than the main fund-
amental iss ues concerning the characte r of local or county 
governments to be maintained in regions which will be 
evacuated as the result of military redispositions pending 
the basic decision on such matters as the Constitutional 
Assembly. 022 
A few weeks after the joint comm.unique was issued 
the conclusion of a Sino- American surplus property sale 
agreement was a nnounced on August 30. This was a sale of 
war supplies to the Na tionalists at bargain prices and 
caused i mmediat e and bitter reactions among the Communist 
members of the truce teams. They erupted in frenzied 
s peeches and accusations about the impartiality of the 
Americans and how they were actively assisting the Nation-
alists .23 For months the Communists had complained because 
the Uni ted States had air-lifted three Nationalist Armies 
and moved them by sea to central China, Formosa , north 
22
°China' s Economic Problems," The Pei£!ng Chronicle, 
August 22, 1946. 
23Lauterbach, loc. cit., p. 348. 
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China, and Manchuri a . Then when the United States sold 
all the surp lus property re s ulting from World T,Nar II in 
t he islands of the south and centra l Pacific to the 
Chinese Nationalist Gov ernment, the Communists were bitter. 
On the othe r hand, this surp lus property agreement a lso 
confirmed in the minds of the Kuomingtang ex tremists 
their estima te that the United States desired to support 
them regardless of the consequence s . An interesting 
summary concerning the effect of t his sale i s found in 
Har l ey F. 1acNair and Donald F . Lach' s book, Modern Far 
Eastern Interna tional Relati~, "This decision placed 
Marshall in the untenable position of m3dia ting between 
t wo Chinese parties while the United S tat es furnished war 
supplies to one of the parties. 024 
2½Jarley F. MacNair and Dona l d F. Lach, Ma::!. ern Far 
Eastern International Relat ions (Chicago: D. Van Dostrand 
Company, Inc. 1950}, p. E42. 
CH.A PTE'R VIII 
ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL 
The Peiping Executive Headquarters st arted with a 
few Army personnel and grew in size from the date of its 
organization on 11 J anuary 1946. It was activated in 
accordance with General Order Number 12 of the United 
States Forces in China Theater, Shanghai, China, and 
signed by Brigadier General Paul W. Carraway, General 
S taff Corps, Acting Chief of Staff. 1 Later on when 
General Marshall effected with the Committee of Three new 
missions for the Headquarters, it was apparent that the 
number of U. s. Army personnel, officers, enlisted men, 
civilian technicians and civilian employees would have to 
be augmented. These missions included the assignment of a 
U. S. Army chairman to field teams in Manch uria, repatri-
a tion assistance, and the planning, coordina ting and 
reconciling of the junction of the Communist Party Army 
with the National Government Army. The initial key organ-
ization was si1nple. A total of one hundred U. S. Army 
officers and soldiers with thirty-two civilians constituted 
the unit. The civilians were Chinese, hired in Peiping 
1History, Peiping Executive Head quarters, loc._cit., 
Second Quarter, Folder I. 
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and Shanghai to be interpreters, t ranslators , warehousemen 
and coolies. The organization chart was as follows: 
Commissioner 
Walter S . Robertson 
Director of Opera tions 
Brigadier General Henr y A. Byroade 
Chief of Staff 
Colonel Louis W. Haskell 
.Administration 
Capt. C. N . 
Beckwith 
Plans & Operations 
Colonel Eugene B. 
Ely 
Railway Control 
Colonel Donald 
C. Hi ll 
Signal Section 
Colonel J. H. 
Ferrick 
Public Relations 
Major W. J. 
Buttain 
The personnel chart had assignments as here indicated: 
Position 
Staff 
Headquarters 
Field Teams 
Headquarters Commandant 
Signal 
Ma in Station 
Field Teams (5) 
Military Police 
Interpreters 
Translation Section 
Public Re lations 
Intelligence Section 
Finance Section 
Medical Section 
Officers 
4 
8 
l 
5 
1 
1 
l 
l 
l 
l 
26 
EM 
12 
8 
12 
15 
10 
l 
2 
2 
..2 
74 
Civilian 
17 
10 
5 
32 
Due to the increase in missions and number of field 
teams, officers and soldiers from the China Theatre and 
the Marines were added to t he complement. More Chinese 
civilians were hired. Foreign Nationals in China, who had 
been mor e or less confined by the Japanese, flocked to the 
headquarters for jobs as office help, truck drivers, radio 
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operators and repairmen. General Marshall , during his 
visit to Washington in March, requested that older offi-
cers be assigned to duty with his mission. Consequently 
each ship to the Orient brought officers, soldiers, tech-
nicians and Department of the Army civilian employees for 
service in China to augment the initial organization in 
Peiping . 2 These were assembled under a subsidiary called 
the Peiping Hea dquarters Group under the supervision of 
Colonel Emons B. Whisner who was named Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Service. 
The mission stateme nt of this is as follows : "The 
Executive Headquar ters is a diplomatic agency r esponsible 
to General George c. Mar shall. The Peiping Headquarters 
Group is a purely .military organization, responsible to 
the War Department, and furnishing the Exe cutive Head-
quarters with .military and civilian personnel, supplies, 
transport a tion, medical services, police protection, mail 
and communications service, engineering, administra tive, 
entertainment and educational services, and other require-
ments for the efficient operation of the Executive 
Headquarter s. u3 
Colone l Whisner further subdivided the activities by 
setting up the Peiping Depot on June 2, 1946. This Depot 
2John Hersey , "Why Were You Sent Out Here," The 
Atlantic , Vol. 179, February 1947, pp. 88-91. 
3History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
Second ~uarter, Folder I I . 
consisted of thirteen sections in accordance with War 
Department procedures. These sections were: 
Depot Head quarters Transport a tion Section 
Army Exchange Special Services 
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Informs.tion and Educ a tion Purchasing and Contra cting 
Team Supply Signal 
Ordnance Q,uarterm.aster 
Medica l Salvage Engineer 
Each of these sections was headed by a Colonel or 
Lt. Colonel. The Headquarters records show that by June 15 
t here were 257 U. s. Army officers, 353 enlisted men, 16 
members of the Women 's Army Corps and 865 civilians in the 
Peiping Executive Headquarters. The latter constituted a 
r egular to~i er of Babel. Chinese, who had been educa ted in 
U. S . s chools or forei gn mission schools, aided the Head-
quar ters a s did Frenchmen, Germans, Austri ans, Englishmen, 
Australians and Russians. These constituted a foreign 
corps of eager wor kers. 
Part of the number of civilians hired cons isted of 
371 tha t helped t he 332nd Troop Carrier Squadron unload, 
load and maintain t he C46 and c47 airplanes that acted as 
couriers and draft horses for t his extended operation. 
Without these hardy vehicles of transport and the 145 
officers a nd 298 en listed men who made week ly tr l ps to 
ea ch team, transported supp lies to the te ams, and brough t 
i n supp l ies from Manila, Shanghai, and Tokyo, General 
Mar shall' s mi s sion would have been i mpossible. For in 
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fact it was completely air supplied; day after day, in all 
kinds of weather and without navigational aids except 
radio, courageo us U.S. flyers took off and landed on 
makeshift airfields all the way from the icy plains of the 
Gobi and Manchuria to the warmth and tropical terrain of 
South China. Several times these planes were fired on, 
and at least in one case a U. s . airman was wounded while 
flying in a plane in a combat area. 
The continued stream of good luck seemed to have 
deserted one pilot , Lt. Bill F . Jeanes, temporarily, when 
he was taking off for Mukden from West Field in Peiping 
early in the afternoon on I.V;ay 1. 4 Immediately after taking 
off one engine quit running . "I was afraid to turn and 
started looking for a place to make a belly_ landing," he 
said. The plane gradually lost altitude for a distance 
of twelve miles. He had a narrow escape but managed to 
steer to t he middle of a valley between two hills where he 
landed in a farmer's field. Lashed in the back was a jeep 
and sitting against the bulkhead was Colonel Benjamin 
Lindaur. 5 The plane skidded for about fifty feet through 
the soft paddy field and came to a stop. The stop caused 
the jeep to break loose. The jeep, hurtling through the 
plane , pushed the naviga tor, Lt. R. E . Chamliss, through 
4rnterview with Lt . Bill F. Jeanes, May 8, 1946. 
5rnterview with Colonel Benjamin Lindaur, May 1, 1946. 
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the bulkhead and pinned Colonel Lindaur to his seat. 
Colonel Lindaur's foot wa s amputated on the spot while 
Lt. Chamliss suffered two broken legs and a broken arm. 
Lt. Jeanes, the pilot, was knocked about suffering severe 
cuts around the face and lost several teeth. It was two 
hours before effective help arrived from the air field to 
ex tricate t he Lieutenants and the Colonel. The Colonel 
was hospitalized in Peking and Shanghai. He died shortly 
in Tokyo on the way back to the States of a liver disruption. 
As represent a tive months, the record for the month of 
May when the 332nd 'rroop Carrier Squadron wa s under com-
ma nd of Lt. Colonel G. H. Van Deusen of Battle Creek, 
Michigan, was outstanding. During this thirty-one day 
period, 102,235 passenger miles were flown; 426,151 pounds 
of cargo were carried; and 109,104 gallons of gasoline 
were used. 6 Twenty planes were operated by 157 officers, 
and, in carrying out their support, they reconnoitered and 
developed new fields in areas of dissension. They also re-
supplied old fields, opera ted a courier schedule, and took 
mail, food, and pay to the men in the field.7 
Air transportation was augmented by motor, railroad, 
and water borne transportation. In the first f ew days of 
the mission, five jeeps with drivers were lent by the 5th 
6
"Army Air Squadron Stationed Here is Keeping up 
Record," The Pei,eins Chronicle, August 13, 1946. 
7History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
Fourth uarter, Folder VI. 
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Regiment of Marines, but with the increase in tasks and 
areas, the motor transport was increased greatly. In 
April, the Transportation Section averaged 40 vehicles in • 
operation with 80 civilian drivers and mechanics to keep 
them going . Most of the drivers spoke no English, but 
they were better and had less accidents on the Chinese 
roads, amongst the Chinese traffic, than most Americ an 
Marines or soldiers had. By the mid dle of June when the 
job of unloading ships at Tangku was placed on the Peiping 
Headquarters Group, the numb er of personnel and vehicles 
assigned was 4 officers, 5 soldiers, and 250 civilian 
emp loyees with 100 vehicles. 
A summary for the month of December s hows 127 light 
passenger vehicles , 27 buses and 78 cargo trucks operating 
a daily average of 10,000 miles. In an average month the 
gasoline and oil consumption was a major supp ly need. All 
items came in 55 gallon drums. Several times the Milit ary 
Police caught Chinese contractors buying emp ty 55 gallon 
drums and carrying off full ones. Howe ver, these figures 
are compiled from tre Transportation users. They are: 
100 Octane gas 4,758 Drums 1,120 Oil 150 Drums 
80 Octane gas 1,056 Drums 1,100 Oi l 80 Drums 
7 Octane gas 280 Drums Diesel Fuell,280 Dru.ms 
Kerosene 250 Drums 
In addition to the costs of food, clothing , supplies 
and maintenance t here were other costs of this operation 
which are not normally considered . These include the pay 
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of the military personnel, the pay of the Department of 
Army employees and local purchase payments . A represent-
ative month, January 1947, shows costs to ha ve been as 
follows : 8 
u. S. Funding Chinese Funding 
Pay & llowances of $ 438,181.37 
Military Personnel 
Pay of Foreign $ 208,360.80 
Nationals 
Pay of U.S. Civil 40,766.80 
Service Employees 
Repairs and Utilities 45,753.77 
Miscellaneous Expenses 9.t.777-77 26,i430.15 
$ 489,752.94 $ 280,547-72 
The Chinese funding was paid out of the Chinese 
National Goverrunent 's revolving fund. The Nationalist 
Government had originally agreed to pay the cost of the 
Three Par ty Peace Mission . They could not have foreseen, 
however , how it was to grow in size or that a terrific 
inflation would occur which changed daily with the possi-
qilities of lasting peace. At the time a typewriter operator 
was hired on May 1, he was receiving 560,000 Chinese National 
currency dollars which was equivalent to 170 American 
9 dollars. This was figured at a rate of 5,275 to l. By 
the time the same operator's job ceased in February, 1947, 
8History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loo. cit~, 
Fourth Quarter, Folder VI. 
9
"New Exchange Rate for U.S. Dollar Announced ," 
The Peiping Chronicle, August 20, 1946. 
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he was being paid i~ l,000,000 Chinese National currency to 
one meric an dolla r. Li tera lly he was a multimillionaire, 
but he couldn't purchase anything with his millions. 
The Chinese Revolving Fund was an arrangement between 
General Marshall and Dr. T. V. Soong which had been concluded 
on July 21, 1946. This initially was one billion dollars, 
Chinese National Currency, which was later increased by 
money allotments made by the u. S. Army, one of $500,000 
from the China Service Comm.and wh ile it was operating and 
$1,079,000 from the War Department Budget Office to charge 
against. 10 
The fore going facts and figures are an exposition of 
the proportion of the United States Army's support to the 
mission of General Marshall during this interesting period. 
This vast undertaking involved the lives of officers, soldiers, 
and civilians that are impossible to calculate in money. On 
t he cash cost, the average dollar expenditure was about 
$400,000 per month for a period of fifteen months. The 
number of typewriters, radios, jeeps, trailers, gallons of 
gasoline and simila r equipment would come up to another half 
million dollars a month; so, in conclusion, the cost of the 
Marshall Mission to the United States was about one billion 
dollars a month. This seemed a small price to pay for the 
evacuation of three million Japanese repa triates and the 
return of 110,000 United States soldiers, sailors, and 
marines to their homes and civilian occupa tions. 
10History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc._ci~., 
First ~uarter, 1947, Folder I. 
·.CHAPTER IX 
RECuGNITION OF DEFEAT 
The military and political situation in China de-
teri orated rap idly from mid-April. During the summer months 
an:i the early fall, the military advantages seemed to be all 
in the fayor of th e Nationalist Government forces who were 
on the offensive everywhere~ Activities on the part of the 
Communists a nd Communist inspired sympathizers helped to 
undermine the Marshall Mission. The f a te of Team No. 11 
under Colonel J. H. Rus temeyer prov ides an example of the 
deplor able condition that existed in the very locales where 
truce teams were in operation. As early as July 2, Colonel 
Rustemeyer's compound at Chengteh was invaded. 2 This 
happened while tbs truce members were conducting a con-
fer ence. A group of citizens accompanied by some Communist 
soldiers forced their way into the compound and made 
numerous demands. They asked the Arericans to cease opera-
ting their r adio, as the Nationalists were receiving in-
formation from it. In later days the civilian populace 
1
"Government Driving Wedge Between Yenan Kalgan," Tm 
Peiping Chronicle, Sep tember 17, 1946. -
2
rnterview with Colonel J. H. Rustemeyer, September 13, 
1946. 
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destroyed roads and bridges in the area, and on .August 27, 
the Comm.unis t section of the Team placed the Americans and 
Nationalists under arrest. Colonel Rustemeyer was forced 
to dismantle his radio. It thus became apparent that in 
North China, Nationalist forces were launching a drive on 
Cheng-teh and Chihfeng. On August 13 the Team was forced 
to evacuate the area with the Communists who were leaving 
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by foot and ox cart. During their retreat the column was 
straffed by two National Government airplanes in the vicinity 
of the road be tween Lung-hua and Wei d' ang. Four members of 
the Team's Communist helpers were killed and one National 
Government team helper. Sergeant Gilbert S. Hengen of the 
United States .Army was badly burned as was a foreign 
national who had been hired as a translator and radio tech-
nician by the Arre ricans. Despite their injuries, they were 
forced to accompany the column all the way to Kalgan, a 
distance of about forty-five miles eastward. They arrived 
on September 10, 1946, and Colonel Rustemeyer and his team 
were airlifted back to Peiping for recuperation. 
Kalgan was a strategic stronghold of the Communists on 
the edge of the Gobi Desert. 3 A city of sorre 60,000 in-
habitants, it was also the gateway to Peiping. Among the 
many reports sent in by team commanders to Peiping Head-
quarters, one that arrived on October 4 from Team No. 3 
3George Moorad, Lost Peace in China, (New York: E. P. 
Dutton & Co. Inc., 1949T pp 114-125. 
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under Colonel Holly at Taiyuan stated that General Fuy 
Vso Yi' s forces, the 34 th Group Army , WJ uld capture Kal gan 
in three days . General S un Lien Chung's XI War Zone Forces 
were also converging on Kalgan along the Peiping- Swyuan 
Rai lway. 
To creat a diversion, the Communists a ttacked and 
occup ied for a day the town of An-tung whi ch was 25 miles 
southeast of P eiping. Chou En-lai and his fellow Communist 
negot i a tors had been aware of the drive on Kal gan and were 
anxious to prevent the Government troops advance. As early 
as October 1, General Chou s ent General Marshall a note from 
Shanghai formally demand ing an immediate cessation of the 
Nationali s t drive. Tbe message was presented to General 
Marshal 1 by the Communist spokesman Wang Ping-nan in Nanking. 4 
It also said t ha t if the drive continued, a final split in 
China wou ld be effected. Wang Ping-nan accused government 
troops of abandoning the gov ernments pronounced policy of 
peaceful s ettl ement. When Chiang 1.ai She k r eceived Chou's 
memorandum , he s ubmitted a counter proposal that embodied 
all the ideas so far discussed between both sides which in-
cluded the g ov ernme nt reorganiz ation plan and the Army r e -
organ i za tion program. If the Communists would comple tely 
agree to t he se points, said Chiang Kai Sm k, t hen the 
4
chris t opher Rand, "Chou Demands Chiang Cease Kalgan 
Attacks," New York Herald Tribune, October 2, 1946, p . 3. 
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National ists would cea::e adva ncing on 1.algan. 
Octo ber 10, "the Double Tenth," is a big holiday in 
China and t ha t da y in 1946 was the 35th Anniv ersa y of the 
esta blishment of the Chine se Rep ublic. A commemorative 
ceremony was he ld in the Nationalist Government's aud i torium 
in Nanking and t h e Generalissimo was reelected President of 
China by the S tanding Committee of the Centra l Executive 
Committee of the Kuoming tang. 5 The Gov ernment also announced 
the p lacing of milit ary co.mm.anders over ci vilian administra-
tors and t he renewal of military conscript ion. 6 A s um.m.ons 
was i s sued fOr the meeting of the National Assembly on 
November 12, 1946, the birthday of Sun Yet-sen. 7 
In t he meantime so much pressure was brough t to bear 
on Ka lgan tmt the Communists literally wal ked out of 
Kalgan and allowed the Na tionalists to take it without a 
struggle. They did thi s in order to p ut the full load of 
responsi bility for fighting on the s houlders of the Nation-
al is ts. Before t hey l ef t, however, they stripped the city 
of f ood and produce. They destroyed the manufactur i ng 
capa bility of the city, disrupted its oommunioations, and 
left a bitter and disgruntled populace to g reet the incoming 
Government f o r ces. 8 
5"Chiang ' s Term of Office Ext ended," The Pei12i~ 
Chronicle, October 11, 1946. 
-
6s tu1;3-rt, loc. c ih, ; • 169; "New Conscript i on Law 
Promulgated," The Pei12ing Chronicle, Octob er 12, 1946. 
7
"Mixed Reactions to Government S tand; Assembly 
Calling Draws Regr e t," Tre Pei~ing ChronicJ&, October 17, 
1946. 
8
"Kalgan is Test to Nationalists After Red Rule," 
A . T. S teele, New Yor k Yerald Tribune, December 21, 1946, 
p . 2 . 
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About mid-October Mr. Walter S. Robertson withdrew 
as the United States Commissioner at Peiping and returned 
to the United States to continue further duties in the 
State Departimnt. Lieutenant General Alvin c. Gillem., Jr., 
was named as his successor as Commissioner and also took 
command o f the Peiping Executive Headquarters Group. 9 
Approximately ten days later on October 26, Chou En-
lai called on General Marshall in the capital. He pointed 
out that the governrent's pollch, which was that of force, 
was necessary, continued to overshadow the peace efforts 
of minority groups and th a t military leaders were obviously 
10 
running the gove n.rrent. 
Fuel was poured on the flame of Communist dissatis-
f action with the United States and General Marshall's peace 
negotiations, with the signing in Nanking of a five year 
treaty of "friendship, commerce and navigation" between 
the United S tates and Chiang Kai Shek' s Government on 
November 4. Ambassador Stuart and Robert Lacy Smith, the 
United States Consul-General at Tientsin signed for the 
United States and Wang Shlh-chieh, the Foreign Minister, 
for China. 11 This treaty superseded all previous treaties 
with the United States, including the original agreement 
9"Robertson Will Leave Post at Head quarte r s,"~ 
Pe~igg C.n;:_£nicle, September 27, 1946. 
lOnNew Technique in Peace Talk," ~ Pei:gl~ Chronicle, 
October 25, 1946. 
11u.s. Department of State, Press Release Nr. 77~, 
November 4, 1946. 
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that had been signed on July 3, 1844. It was a reciprocal 
treaty but included a most favored nation clause, but no-
where in its pa ges we r e there any provisions for extra-
territoriality. Tbe rights of Americans were great ly cur-
t ailed when compared to the privileges they had previously 
enjoyed . 
Chou En-lai conferred with General Marshall on November 
10 and attended a full scale meeting of the Commit tee of Three 
on the next day. No agreement resulted in this meeting. 
Immediately thereafter the Government announced that the 
National 12 ssemb ly wo uld me et on the fifteen th of the month. 
Just one day before the Assemb ly was to meet, General 
Chou announced that he was returning to Yenan because his 
mission was finished. In the announcement he repeated t hat 
the Nationalists occupation of Kalgan had brought about a 
national split militarily. " Subse quently the Government 
ha s taken over Antung ," he said on November 14 in Nanking. 
"'l'he n the unilateral Ass embly was cal led. When that opens, " 
he continued, "all the agreements , the cease fire, the 
Political Consultative Confer ence, and military reorganiza-
tion will have been torn to pieces. Since the basis of my 
n egotiations is being made a scrap of paper, my mission has 
terminated. Therefore, nothing remains but for me to go 
back to Yenan . n 13 He also stated that a Communist liaison 
120General Chou C,ff to Yenan", The Pei2,i.Q.8. Chronic le, 
November 21, 1946. 
13~. 
105 
officer, Tun P i-wu, would remain in Nanking • 
.A s t he Gov ernment had pre vi ously announced, the 
National Assembly met on Nov ember 15, in s p ite of Communist 
objections. 14 It t hen continued to sit in session for a 
p eriod of six weeks during whic h time it drafted a new con-
stitution. 
The day after the meeting, General Chou En-lai held 
a press conf erence in which he presented his case in more 
detaii. 15 It is a significant summary of the Communist 
attitude toward developments in China during 1946: 
"The government authorities ba.ve t h oroughly destroyed 
the status quo of the 'Cease Fire' ord er of Jan uary 13, 
and the f our promises p ledged by the r esponsible authorites 
of tbe Government at the inaugeral meeting of the PCC have 
been broken utterly by the Kuomi ng tang's gestapo rule from 
the time of the Chiaoch'angkuo incident in Chungking in 
February to the assassinations of Li Kung Po and Wen Yi To, 
leading members of t he Democratic League. 
"The underlying principle of the mill tary a greement 
wa s the separ a tion o f the military and civilian adminis tra-
tion. Nevertheless, it is an obvious fact tha t at the 
present mome nt all the Provinci a l gov ernors a ppoint ed by 
the Kuomingtan g Government are military men on a ctive 
service. 
"The decision regarding the Nationa l As sembly was the 
last piece of compro mise r ea ched dyring the FCC discussions. 
The Kuoming tang aut ho r ities at the time pledged not to call 
the National .A ssembly which was ma nipulated by one party 
alone and would entail a split. 
" Only when civil war is stopped, the FCC deci s ions are 
carried out, the people's fr eedoms a re safeguarded, and the 
reo r ganizat ion of the gov ernment achieved, should del egates 
regard the National Assembly as a reunited congress partici-
pated in by all parties." 
14"Na tional Assembly ba.s First Formal Meeting ," The 
Pei12ing C.br onicle, Novemb er 26, 1946. -
15His tory, Peiping Executive Head q uarters, loo. cit. 
Four th Ouarter, Fold er 1. 
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The very next day on November 17, 1946, Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai She k opene d a Conference of Governors which was 
Called to give them dir e ctions on how to govern areas taken 
over from t.be Communists. rrThe Government can crush the 
Communist Anny in five months, whereas the political fi ght 
Will t a ke another five years," he declared. Later on in 
the cont ere nee he is reported to ha ve said that land re-
forms must be better t han the Communist Economic Policy in 
order to win over the peopld. rrThe people's livelihood 
must be improved, so a s to make the people c ap able of doing 
things for their own welfare and the good of the Kuomingtang , 0 
he emphasi zed. 
On the same day, Chou En-lai, his wife, and th irteen 
members of his staff went to Yenan on General Marshall's 
new transport plane which was piloted by Colons 1 J. Hart 
Caug hey of the United States Air Force. Similarly on 
November 21, ten members of the Co.mmunis t Party group in 
Peiping went to Yenan from Peiping. This was the beginning 
of the complete Communist departure from Nan king and their 
disassociation with the Marshall Mission. 
The tak ing of Kalgan and the lack of political agree-
ment cone crning the cal ling of the Na tional Assembly was 
reflected in the attitude of the Communist .members of the 
field teams. All were bitter and resentful and as a result 
truce negotiations came to a halt in every truce team area. 
They refused to attend meetings, and where they did one or 
another of their members would launch into a long dis-
cussion on democratic principles or cooperative action 
which VJould bog tbe meeting down completely. By the end 
of November conditions were so bad that out of a tot al of 
28 truce tea.ms in China, eleven were sent to Pei ping to 
give physical protection to e ither the Communist or the 
N t . 1 · 16 0 1 f f th a 1.ona 1.st Govern.men t members. n y our o e seven-
teen teams remaining in the field had a full complement of 
negotiators and one of the four - No. Ten - because of the 
restructions imposed by the National Government against 
the Communist member of the team, Gen eral Huang , was inactive. 
He was released and returned to Han Tan on CJctob er 30, 1946, 
in custody of the Ame rican member. 17 By Thanksgiving Day what 
teams were left in Manchuria were in the Head quarters at 
Changchun. For all pr a ctical pur poses truce team activity 
had come to an end in China by ·that ti.me. 
The day that Gener al Chou left Nanking seemed pro-
pitious for the whole headquarters to fold up and q11it but 
18 
each party hesitated to take the step. General Marshall 
had faith in the Headquarters as a nucleus around which to 
build a Peace Adm.in.is trat ion in the event that a gree.ment 
should be reached between the two opponents. The personnel 
160changchun Again Threatened with New Red At tack,'' 
The PeiEi!JA Chronicle, November 24, 1946. 
17His tory, Peiping Etecutive Head quarters, loc. cit • , 
Fourth Q,ua rter, Team Ten. 
18chri stophe r Rand, "Chou En-lai in Yenan," New York 
Herald Tribune, December 18, 1946, p. 3. 
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of the head quarters also presented him with enough eyes 
and ears in many areas to d e t ermine actual conditions 
without relying on the reports of the two opposing parties. 
The Comm.unis ts enc our aged General Marshall and the United 
States members to stay in China and continue their work 
because t hey feared t hat if the Americans departed the 
United S t a tes would give t heir all out aid to Chian Kai 
Shek. The Communists were also enabled to operate and in-
telligence and communic ation n e t and maintain contact with 
many of their units with which they otherwise would ha ve 
had no contact. 19 The Nationalists wer-e able to use the 
Executive Headquarters as a communication center and a 
point of cont act in areas where otherwise there would have 
been none, and they also encouraged the United States 
members to vo uch for their need of the United States ec-
onomic support. 
When the National Assembly met without the Communists, 
trere were 2,050 delegates. They represented 760 regional 
areas in China. Of these delegated 379 represented farmers, 
laborers, and commercial workers; 153 special d elegates 
represented overseas communities; 58 represented professions 
and 700 represented political organizations which included 
the Democratic League and the Youth League. Among the 
presiding officers were Chiang Kai Shek; Doctor Hu Shih, 
19nReds Protest Over Changchun Affair," North-China 
Daill News, Shanghai, January 27, 1947. 
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President of' the Peiping National University; and Gen eral 
20 Ho Chung-chun. This group was successful in formulating 
and presenting to Genera 1 Chiang Kai She k on Chris tn:a s Day, 
a draft constitution with many liberal principles. On 
December 31, 1946, the Constitution was promula ted as the 
law of' t he land. 21 It was r ealized by both the Co.mmunis t 
Party Commissioner in Peiping, and the National Government 
ther e, t h at the peace neg otiating machinery which had been 
set up in the beg inning of the _year was now discarded com-
pletely. 
Soldiers end of ficers of the United States Anny in 
China had been speculating, as military personnel wil l , 
wm ther the Marshall Mission would quit and whether they 
would be allowed to return to the United States. 22 Most 
of them were agreed that their work was f'inished and they 
could do no more to solve the Chinese riddle. Virtually 
anticipated an immediate trip back to the good old USA. 
But their hopes were dashed by President Harry s. Truman's 
China policy statement on December 18, 1948, which was 
published in the newspapers of the United States and 
China. President Truman reiterated that the views he had 
expressed one year before were still sound. He stated that 
China is a sovereign nation and expressed the hope that 
20
"Na tional .A ssembly has First Formal Me eting," The 
Peiping Chron~, November 26, 1946. 
21
"Chiang igns Promulgation Order for Constitution," 
North-China Daill News (Sbanghai), January 1, 1947. 
22
.A. T. Steele , "U.S. Navy Likely to Make a Long 
Stay," ~ew York Herald Tribune, December 16, 1946. 
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the GOV ernment wot1ld f irii a _peaceful solution to the un-
if ic at ion crisis. He repeated that the United States wot1ld 
not interfere with the internal affairs in China and would 
search for ways and means for constructive aid. President 
Truman emphasi zed that "when conditions in China improve, 
we are prepared to consider aid in carrying out other pro-
jects, unrelated to civil strife, which wot1ld encot1rage 
economic reconstruction and retorm in China, and which in 
so doing, would promote a general revival of commercial 
relations between .American and Chinese busi nessmen." 
The President concluded his statement by summarizing 
.Am.eri can e conoro.ic and mi lit ar y aid to China: " ( 1) Three 
.Armies were moved by air and eleven by sea to Central 
China, Formosa, North China, and Mancht1ria. (2) The 
United States Government at1thorized ~66,000,000 in six 
spe cified projects fo r rehabilitation. (3) United States 
assistance took the fonn of gocx:l.s and e quiprrent and services, 
almost half being the cost of transportation of troops. 
(4) From VJ Day to the end of February the total lend 
A6 lease was ~ 00,000,000. (5) China agreed to bt1y all 
st1rplus property owned by th e Unit ed States in China am 
on seventeen Pacific is lands and bases with certain excep-
tions • .Aircraft, all demilitarized combat material, and 
fixed installations outside of China were exclucled, and 
(6) .At peak strength a ye ar ago, the United States bad 
111 
some 113,000 s oldiers, sailors and marires in China. Tcnay 
t h is number is r educed to less t han 12,000 including some 
2,000 directly cone erned with the operations of Executive 
Head quarter s and will be furthe r reduced to t h e number 
required to supp ly and secure Arrerican personnel of Executive 
Hea d r_uarte r s and the airfield and stores at Tsing tao." 
After r 8 ading and pondering Mr. Trun:rui's statement the 
members of t he United States Army with its si s ter servic es, 
tm Marine Corps, the United S tates Navy, and the Air Force, 
c one luded t hat they would remain in China for an indefinite 
period. Time, however, shcmed that t h is was not to be the 
case.
23 
23Frank Kelley, "Marshall to S t a y at Post,'' New 
York erald Tr i bune, Dec ember 19, 1946. 
CHAPTER X 
WITHDRAWAL OF THE kll"lSSION 
Events in other parts of the world were shaping up 
which called for major policy decisions in the United States 
regarding the use of its army and its resources. Contrary 
to expectations, General Marshall was recalled to the United 
States on January 7, 1947, to serve as Secretary of Sta te 
in President Truman's cabinet. 1 This position he held from 
the tine of his appointment on January 21, 1947, until 
January 20, 1949. Upon receipt of the announcement of 
General Marshall's recall, both factions in China were 
greatly surprised but fulsome in their praise of General 
Mars.hall 's work. 2 The head of the Communist liaison group 
at Nanking, Mr. Wang Ping-nan, said, "General Marshall has 
more understanding about China than anyone else, and this 
is what we can expect upon his assumption of his new post."3 
l"Marshall Named Secretary of State as Byrnes Resigns," 
North-China Daill News , (Shanghai) January 3, 1947. 
2
"Nanking Surprised by Marshall 's Recall ," North-China 
Daill News, (Shanghai) January 8, 1947. 
3History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loc. cit., 
First ~uarter, 1947, Folder I . 
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Generalissimo Chiang thought so highly of General Marshall 
and his work that he offered him the post of Supreme Advisor 
so that "he could continue to make of China the kind of 
country which Chinese and Americans alike desired . ,,4 
Chen Li-Fu, leader of the Kuomingtang right wing was 
''a great friend and a great ally" and would have succeeded 
in his "struggle in China 's cause" except for the dis trust 
of the "handful of Chinese that is the Comm.unis t party. n5 
General Chou En-Lai , in a speech delivered at Yenan on 
January 10, 1947, laid at Chiang Kai Shek's door the r espon-
sibility for General Marsha ll's lack of success. He asked 
that the new Secretary of State "review the United States 
Governme n t's China policy during the past year , cease 
repeating past mistakes, ceas e aiding the Chiang Kai-Shek 
government in waging of civil war, withdraw American troops 
from China, refrain from intervening in Chinese int er.na l 
affairs, and readjust Sino-American relations." 
Before General Marshall left China he issued a personal 
statement which summarized his work there as the Special 
Representative of President Trum.an. 6 The main purpose of 
his statement was to explain to the American people the 
Chief difficulty which he encountered in trying to negotiate 
a settlemen t between the Nationalists and the Communists. 
----------------
4stuart, loc. cit., p . 178. 
5rsaacs, loc. cit., p. 69. 
6u.s. Department of State, loc. cit., p. 686 . 
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"In the first place," he said, "the greatest obstacle 
to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming sus-
picion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the 
Kuomingtang regard each other." He went on to emphasize 
the vicious propaganda used by the Comrnunists. He found 
that in both parties the military officers and hierarchy 
domina ted civil government which he considered an unhealthy 
state. General Marshall described the long-suffering, 
inarticulate masses in China who went about their daily 
tasks bearing patiently their burdens like beasts in the 
field. He also estimated the probable course of action the 
Communists would take in the future. "The Communists by 
their unwillingness to compromise in the na tional interes t 
are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring 
about the fall of the government, accelerated by extensive 
guerrilla action against the long line s of rail communi-
cations - regardless of the cost in suffering to the 
Chinese people." 7 
This has proved to be a correct estimate. 
Upon receipt of the announce.rrent of General Marshall's 
appointment to the position of Secretary of State, General 
Gillem, who succeeded him, began to bring into the Head-
quarters at Peking the officers, men, and equipment of the 
Various field teams. This was actually the first step in 
Closing out United States Army effort to bring order to 
China. Communist and Nationalist truce team members, their 
... ______________ _ 
7Ibid. 
-
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wives, children, and dependents, were soon airlifted to 
their homes. 8 United S tates Army officers and soldiers were 
screened and those with insufficient overseas time were sen t 
to Korea , Japan , or to Nanking where an advisory group was 
being assembled to coach the Na tionalist Army. .An official 
pronouncement was ..a:ade by the Ame rican embassy in Nanking 
on January 29, 1947, conc erning the withdrawal of the United 
S tates from the Committee of Three and tbe Executive He ad-
quarters in Peking. Accordingly, on J anuary JO, the Na tion-
alist Government announced that the Com.m.ittee of Three and 
the Executive Headquarters were dissolved.9 
Lieutenant General A . C. Gillem, Jr., United States 
Commissioner at Peking, ga ve the final death blavv to the 
Marshall Mission on February 6, 1947, when he delivered 
identical letters to the Communist Party and the National 
Government Headquarters just before the normal time for 
quitting daily business. 10 These letters were as follows: 
"Thi~ is the conclusion of the most unique mission 
during the long history of the United States Army. 
"The United States Army , closely following its great 
victory of the Second World War, turned to the task of ass-
isting the Chinese in the tortuous job of accomplishing 
internal peace and recovery. Many of the officers and men 
who had served in China during the war with the Japanese 
turned their organizational ability and their other talents 
to the establishment of a peace, not based on the superiority 
8uu.s. Withdrawing Troops from Executive Headquarters," 
North-China Da1ll News (Shanghai) January JO, 1947. 
9History, Peiping Executive Headquarters, loo. cit., 
First Quarter, 1947, Folder I. 
lOibid. 
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of arms, but on the firmer founda tions of compromise and 
underst anding . The dependents of many officers and men 
were brough t to China and homes esta blished in Peiping 
before the decision of our governmen t was made to withdraw 
from medi a tion." 
In a press conference t he same day, General Gillem told 
listeners t ha t tap s had sounded for the American organization. 
The General did not utilize this opportunity to tell why the 
Marshall mission had ffailed. In his sensitive position one 
could not have expected tha t he would . 
One of the influen ti a l Na tional Government spokesmen, 
Doctor Hu Shih, writing in 1953, explained why he thought 
the Marshall Mission did not achieve its goals . "The first 
objective was to ca use the Chinese to form a coalition 
governmen t with the Chinese Communists f a irly and effectively 
represented," he wrote; " the second was to ca use t hem to 
elimi na t e t he autonomous armie s of the Chinese Communist 
Party and integr a te them into the Na tional Army. Such was 
the inherently impossible dual t a sk of the Ma r shall Mission. 
. . . . . . The weapon was to be not military pressure or 
intervention, but the withholding of American aid to China. 
But this weapon could only checkma te the Chinese Government 
and had no effect whatever on the Chinese Communists •.••.• 
So the Marshall Mission failed bec a use of the inherently 
i mpossible objectives." Doctor Hu Shih also concludes that 
Doctor Leighton S tuart failed as an a s s istant to General 
Marshall because he had no form of pressure to apply on the 
Communists except that of friendship and good will. 11 
11 S tuart, loc. cit., pp . x vi-x vix. 
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This estima te is a differen t aspect than that of l r. 
Lo Lung-Chi, one of the l eaders of t he Left Wing Democ ra tic 
League which had boycotted the Na tional Assembly along with 
t he Communists. His remarks were , "General Marshall is 
operating on two mistaken assump tions. First is his expect-
ation that this Governmen t can be democratic; and second , 
that, even granti ng that this is possible , the Communists 
will join it provided it is liberalized. These assumptions 
show a lack of understanding of Chinese psychology and 
Chinese history since 1911.rr 12 
Referring to General Chou En- Lai 's speech of January 10, 
1947, he states flatly the Communist view t ha t the failure 
of General Marshall's mission "is all the result of the 
c arrying on of the civil war by Chiang Kai Shek ."13 
The United Sta tes Army popula tion connected with the 
Marahall Mission on February 5, 1947, included 352 officers, 
626 enlisted men , 128 War Department civilian emp loyees ~nd 
2,132 locally hired civilians. 14 There were also 339 vehi-
cles of both the quarter-ton jeep variety and 2½-ton cargo 
trucks. The discharge of the civilians cam.e as quite a blow 
to the foreign nationals who had survived the previous Japa-
nese occupa tion of North China . Within the next two months 
the officers and dependents, the soldiers, and the War 
12Lieberman, loc. cit., January 6, 1947, p. 6. 
13rsaacs, loc. cit., p. 77. 
14
"Gis Await Signal ," North-China Dail,Y News, (Shangha i) 
January 31, 1947. 
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Department civilian employees were shipped to the United 
States on the two Army Transports, the General Weigel and 
the General Brewster , and the Navy hospital ship, Benevolence, 
which was returning home from the Bikini Tests. 
The vehicles, radios, post exchange supplies , and hun-
dreds of other items that the U.S . Army finds necess ary at 
home or away from home were turned over to r epresenta tives 
of the U.S. Foreign Liquidation Commission that came to 
Peking for that purpose .15 
The 332nd Troop Transport Squadron, aft er delivering 
all to their new assignments, reported to the Army Advisory 
Group in Nanking . All quarters were turned back to the 
Na tional Government except the Peking Union Medical College 
which was returned to the Administrator, Mr. Trevor Bowen . 
Among the supplies which were not disposed of in China by 
tre Foreign Liquid a tion Commission was a 100 bed hospital 
unit. This equipment was shipped to the 24th U.S. Army 
Corps in I ore a. 
Many conclusions can be and a re dr awn from the exper-
iences of the personnel of the U.S. Army in this year-long 
effort at mediation. The first and obvious one was that the 
goal to be achieved and the methods to be utilized obtaining 
the goal must be agreed upon by the contending factions 
before an attempt is made to mediate. The seco.rrl conclusion 
is that when the United States accepts the role of mediator, 
15"Americans Prepare to Q,uit Peiping ," North-China Dail_z 
News (Shanghai ), February 6, 1947. 
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limits s hould be announced beyond which the medi a tors will 
not go. Members of the Truce Teams knew their work was 
being bogged down in minute details after the return of 
General Marshall to China in April. With the passing of 
each day thereafter the U.S. mediating group lost prestige 
and influence. 
In considering the larger picture, President Truman 
sent General Marshall to China to obtain the unification of 
China by peaceful,democra tic methods. He ga ve him as a 
weapon of pressure the power to grant or withhold American 
economic assistance. In addition he was given two tasks, 
the evacuation of Japanese troops from North China and the 
withdrawal of United States .Armed Forces from the mainland 
of China. Both tasks Genere.l Marshall achieved through the 
operation of the Peiping Executive Headquarters which was 
provided by the United States Army . 
The failure of General Marshall to accomplish the uni-
fic a tion of China was because it was an impossible task 
founded on false foundations. The United States had 
accepted the Nationalist Government of Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai Shek as the Government of China when it was not so in 
fact by any stretch of the imagination. In an article 
appearing in the New York Times on January 7, 1947, James 
Reston stated, "It cannot be said that his mission to China 
was a spectacular success. That mission was to use his 
influence to bring the contending parties in China together. 
This has not been accomplished but at least a certain 
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balance of power between these parties has been attained, 
and t his in turn has prevented any great shift in the balance 
of power in Asia since the end of the war."16 
There is no doubt that the U. s. Army's role in China 
during this trying time was an unusual one. The carrying 
out of thi s role depended upon the adaptability and resource-
fulness of the officers and soldiers serving in China. By 
t he application of their abilities they were able to utilize 
military administration and communication techniques to the 
task of reconciling warring f actions in China and achieved 
some measure of success. This was a trial period. It was 
a good introduction to diplomacy and foreign relations for 
General Marshall. It prepared him for the position of 
Secretary of State and proved to be an excellent foundation 
both for him and the United States during the troubled years 
which followed. 
16Jame s Res ton, "Marshall is Summoned by Truman for 
Report on His Efforts in China," New York Times, January 7, 
1947, p. 2. 
APPENDIX I 
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD 
CHINA, 1945 
President Truman to the Special Representative of the 
President to China 
My Dear General Marshall: 
Washington, D.C. 
15 December 1945 
On the eve of your departure for China, I want to 
repeat to you my appreciation of you willingness to 
undertake this difficult mission. 
I have the utmost confidence in your ability to 
handle the task before you but, to guide you insofar as 
you may find it helpful, I shall give you some of the 
thoughts, ideas and objectives which Secretary Byrnes 
and I have in mind with regard to your mission. 
I attach several documents which I desire should 
be considered as part of this letter. One is a statement 
of U.S. policy towards China which was, I understand, 
prepared after consultation with you and with officials 
of the Department. The second is a memorandum from the 
Secretary of the State to the War Department in regard 
to China. And the third is a copy of my press release 
on policy in China. I understand that these documents 
bave been shown to you and received your approval. 
The fact that I have asked you to go to China is 
the clearest evidence of my very real concern with regard 
to the situation there. Secretary Byrnes and I are both 
anxious that the unification or China by peaceful, demo-
cratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. It is 
my desire that you, as my Special Representative, bring 
to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the 
influence of the United States to this end. 
Specifically I desire that you endeavor to persuade 
the Chinese Government t o hold a national conference of 
representatives of the ma jor political elements to bring 
about the unification of China and, concurrently, to 
effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north 
China. 
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It is my understanding that there is now in session 
in Chungking a Peoples Consultative Council made up of 
representatives of the various political elements, inclu-
ding the Chine se Communists. A meeting of this Council 
should furnish you with a convenient opportunity for dis-
cussions with the various political leaders. 
Upon the success of your efforts, as outlined above, 
will depend largely, of course, the success of our plans 
for the evacuation of Japanese troops from China, par-
ticularly north China, and for the subsequent withdrawal 
of our own armed forces from China. I am particularly 
de s irous that both be accomplished as soon as possible. 
In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and 
other Chinese leaders, you are authorized to speak with 
the utmost frankness. Particularly, you may state, in 
connection with the Chinese desire for credits, te chnical 
assistance in economic field and military assistance (I 
have in mind the proposed U.S. military advisor group 
which I have approved in principle), that a China disunited 
and torn by civil strife could not be considered realis-
tically as having proper place for American assis tance 
along the line s enumerated. 
I am anxious that you keep Secretary Byrnes and 
me currently informed of the progress of your negotiations 
and of obstacles you may encounter. You will have our 
full support and we shall endeavor at all times to be 
as helpful to you as possible. 
Sincerely yours, 
Harry Truman 
1 23 
Memorandum by Secretary Byrnes 
Washington, D.C. 
December 9, 1945 
For the War Department 
The President and the Secretary of the State are 
both anxious tha t the unification of China by peaceful 
democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. At 
afpublic hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee 
0 the Senate on December 7, the Secretary of State said: 
"During the war, the immediate goal of the United 
States in China was to provide a military union of the 
~~veral pol itical factions in order to bring their com-
1ined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our 
ong range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least 
equal importance is the development of a strong united 
and democratic China. 
"To achieve this longer range goal it is essential 
that the Central Govern.m.ent of China as well as the var-
~~us dissident elements approach the settlement of their 
ifferences with a genuine willingness to compromise. 
We believe, as we have long believed and consistently 
demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-Shek affords the most satisfactory base for 
a developing democracy. But we also believe that it 
must be broadened to include the representatives of 
those large and well organized groups who are without 
any voice in the government of China. 
"This problem is not an easy one. It requires 
tact and discretion, patience and restraint. It will 
not be solved by the Chinese leaders themselves. To 
the extent that our influence is a factor, succes s will 
depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in 
the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to 
encourage concessions to the Central Government, by the 
so called communists, by the other factions." 
The President has asked General Marshall to go to 
China as his special representative for the purpose of 
bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable man-
ner, the influence of the United States for the achieve-
ment of the ends set forth above. Specifically General 
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Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese govern-
ment to call a national conference of representatives 
of the major political elements to bring about the uni-
fication of China and, concurrently, affect a cessation 
of host ilities, particularly in north China. 
In respect to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, 
the S t ate Department requests the War Department to 
arrange for directions to him stipulating that: 
1. He may put into effect the arrangements to 
assist the Chinese National Government in transporting 
Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including logistical 
support of such troops; 
2. He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped 
up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from 
the Chinese Theatre; 
3. Pending the outcome of General Marshall's dis-
cussion with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose 
of arranging a national conference of representatives of 
the major political elements and for a cessation of hos-
t ilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to 
north China, except as north China ports may be necessary 
for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, 
will be held in abeyance; 
4. Arrangements for transportation of Chinese 
troops into north China may be immediately perfected, 
but not communicated to the Chinese government. Such 
a rrangements will be executed when General Marshall 
determines either -
(a) that the movement of Chinese troops to 
north China can be carried out consistently with his 
negotiations, or 
(b) that the negotiations between the Chinese 
groups h a ve failed or show no prospect of success and 
that the circumstances are such as t o make the movement 
necessary to effectuate surrender teams and to secure the 
long term interest of the United States in the mainten-
ance of international peace. 
U.S. Policl Toward_China 
Statement by President Harry s. Truman 
(December 15, 1945) 
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The Government of the United States holds that 
peace and prosperity of the world in this new and un-
explored era ahead depend upon the ability of the sov-
ereign nations to combine for collective security in 
the United Nations Organizat ion. 
It is the firm belief of this Government that a 
strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost 
importance to the success of this United Nations 
Organization and for world peace. A China disorganized 
and divided either by foreign aggression, such as that 
undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal 
strife, is an undermining influence to world stability 
and peace, ncm and in the future. 
The United States Government has long subscribed 
to the principle that the managerrent of internal affairs 
i s the responsibility of the people of the sovereign 
nations . Events of thi s century, however, would indi-
cate that a breach of peace anywhere in the world threat-
ens the peace of the entire world. It i s thus in the 
most vital interest of the United States and all the 
United Nations that the people of China overlook no 
opportunity to adjust their internal differences promp-
tly by methods of peaceful negotiation. 
The Government of the United States believes it 
essential: 
l. - That a cessation of hostilities be 
arranged between the armies of the National Government 
and the Chinese Communists and other dissident Chinese 
ar.n:sd forc es for the purpose of completing the return 
of all China to effective Chinese control, including 
the immediate evacuation of the Japanese forces. 
2. - That a national oonference of representatives 
of major political elements be arranged to develop an 
early solution to the present internal strife - a solution 
which will bring about the unification of China. 
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The United States and the other United Nations 
have recognized the present National- Government of the 
Republic of China as the only legal Government in China 
It is proper instrument to achieve the objective of a • 
unified China. 
The United States and the United Kingdom by the 
Cairo Declaration in 1943, and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, by adhering to the Potsdam 
Declaration of last July and by the Sino-Soviet treaty 
and agreement of August 1945 are all committed to the 
liberation of China , including the return of Manchuria 
to Chinese control . These agreements were made with 
the National Government of the Republic of China . 
In continuation of the constant and close coll-
aboration with the National Government of the Republic 
of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance 
with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility 
of Japanese influence remaining in China , the United 
States has assumed a definite obligation in the di s-
armament and evacuation of Japanese troops in the lib-
erated areas . The United States Marines are in North 
China for t hat purpose. 
The United States recognizes and will continue to 
recognize the National Government of China and cooperate 
with it in international affairs and specifically in 
eliminating Japanese influence from China . The United 
States i s convinced that a prompt arrangement for a 
cessation of hostilities is essential to the effective 
achievement of this end . 
United States support will not extend to United 
States military intervention to influence the course 
of any Chinese internal strife. 
The United States has already been compelled to 
pay a gr eat price to restore the peace which was first 
broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria . The main-
tenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized , if 
not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is 
wholly removed and unless China takes her place .as a 
unified democratic and peaceful nation. This 1s the 
purpose'or the maintenance , for the time being , of 
United states military and naval forces in China . 
The United States is cognizant that the present 
National Government of China is a one-party Government 
and believes that peace, unity and democratic reform 
in China will be furthered if the basis of this Govern-
ment is broadened to include other political elements 
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in the country. Hence, the United States strongly 
advocates that the national conference of representatives 
of major political elements in the country agree upon 
arrangements which would give those elements a fair and 
effective representation in the Chinese National Govern-
ment. It is recognized that this would require modifi-
cation of the one-party political tutelage established 
as an interim arrangement in the progress of the nation 
toward democracy by the Father of the Chinese Republic, 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen. 
The existance of autonomous armies, such as that 
of the Communist army, is inconsistent with, and ac-
tually makes impossible, political unity in China. 
With the institution of a broadly representative gov-
ernment, autonomous armies should be eliminated as such 
~nd all armed forces in China integrated effectively 
into the Chinese National Army. 
In line with its often expressed views regarding 
self-determination , the United States Government con-
siders that the detailed steps necessary to the achieve-
ment of political unity in China must be worked out by 
the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any 
foreign government in these .matters would be inapprop-
riate. 
The United States Government feels, however, that 
China has a clear responsibility to the other United 
Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory 
as constituting a threat to world stability and peace-
a responsibility which is shared by the National Govern-
ment and all Chinese political and military groups • 
.As China moves toward peace and unity along the 
lines described above, the United States would be pre-
pared to assist the National Government in every rea-
sonable way to rehabilitate the country, improve the 
agrarian and industrial economy, and establish a mili-
tary organization capable of discharging China's national 
and international responsibilities for the maintenance 
of peace and order. 
In furtherance of such assistance, it would be 
prepared to give favorable consideration to Chinese 
requests for credits and loans under reasonable condi-
tions for projects which would contribute toward the 
development of a healthy economy throughout China and 
healthy trade relations between China and the United 
States. 
APPENDIX II 
GENERAL MARSHALL'S PRESS CONFERENCE 
March 16, 1946 
EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS 
PEIPJNG CHJNA 
TO: All Executive Headquarters Field Teams 
20 March 1946 
l. The inclosed official account of General Marshall's 
Press conference in Washington on 16 March (in English) has 
been reproduced for distribution to all Executive Headquarters 
Field Team personnel. Copies of the free Chinese translation 
as released to the Chinese Press by USIS are also incl osed. 
2. General Marshall's statement is a clear indication 
of the importance of the work that each of you 1s doing. 
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY 
Capt. K.H. MOSES 
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WALTERS. ROBERTSON 
u. S. Commissioner. 
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ho . V!AS~G?ON, March 16 - General C. Marshall, 
lding his first press conference today since his return 
~esterday from three month mission in China as President 
m!~a~'s per~onal representative, told of progress being 
e in uniting that country, and of importance of its 
unity to the world. 
"If the world wants peace," he said, "China's effort 
mutst succeed, and that success will depend largely on 
0 her nations." 
back 
General Marshall revealed that he will be going 
to China soon. f ~eneral Marshall authorized direct quotation of the 
ollow1ng statement made at the beginning of his press 
conference: 
I 
"The Chinese people are engaged in an effort which 
think should co.mm.and the cooperation of the entire 
world. It is an effort almost without precedent. Their 
leaders are making daily progress towards the settlement 
by peaceful discussion of deep-seated and bitter conflicts 
over the past twenty years. 
"They are succeeding in terminating the hostilities 
of the past twenty years. They have reached agreements 
and are now engaged in the business of demobilizing vast 
~ilitary forces and unifying and integrating the remain-
ing forces into a national army. They have agreed to the 
basic principles for the achievement in China of political 
and economic advances which were centuries coming to 
western democraties. 
"If we are to have peace, if the world wants peace, 
there are compelling reasons why China's present effort 
must succeed and its success will depend in a large 
measure on action of other nations. If China is ignored 
or if there is scheming to thwart the· development of 
unity and present aspirations, why of course, their ef-
forts inevitably will fail. 
"The United States, I think, at the present time 
i s best able to render material assistance to China. I 
feel quite certain of the sympathetic interest of the 
U.S. people in China, but I am not quite.so certai~ as 
to their understanding or the understanding of the1~ 
political leaders of the vital importance to the United 
States of the success of the present Chinese efforts 
towards unity and economic stability if we.are to have 
the continued peace we hope for in the Pacific. 
"Incidentally, I don't believe any 1:9-tion can find 
justification for suspicion as to our motives in China. 
We are asking for no special preferences of any kind what-
soever regarding economic or similar matters. We are 
Placing ·no price on our friendship, I must say, though 
that we have a vital interest in a stable government in 
China and r run using the word •vital' in its accurate 
sense. 
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t '.'The next few months are of tremendous importance to 
he Chinese people and, I think, to the future peace of the 
~orld. I am. now using that term in its longer sense, that 
1s, through the years. Stable governments in Asia are of 
great importance to us not to mention what they mean to 
the people who have suffered to a degree which the Chinese 
have during the past decade. 
"I have met on every band the most generous recep-
tion, the most remarkable reception, I might say, and it 
seemed to me a very understanding cooperation towards 
whatever efforts I might be making. The situation of 
course has been most complicated throughout my brief stay 
in China, first by the disturbed conditions in this coun-
try, in the army in the Pacific, and then later by the 
critical state of affairs in Manchuria. 
"Despite the s e difficulties I think tremendous 
progress has been made. 
"I would like to have you understand so.me thing of 
an organization that has been established in Peiping 
which we call Executive Headquarters. That is the most 
important instrument we have in China at the present time. 
Agreements are all very well but unless you have a means 
for carrying them out, particularly when they are intended 
to resolve bitter differences of large groups of people, 
you must have some means of implementing those agreements. 
"So we have in Peiping a headquarters consisting of 
three commissioners, the Chairman of which is an American, 
the other two members representing the Government and the 
Communist party, and then we have an American Chief of 
Staff and under him is a group of about 250 officers. The 
core of the organization is American with the represen-
tatives of the National Government on one side and the 
Communists on the other, and they are brought together 
with this framework of an American staff. They are repre-
sented out in the field throdghout the critical portions 
of China by little teams of dhree men, one American, one 
Governmental representative and one Communist represen-
tative and the force and effec t of these agreements and 
the detailed orders to carry them into effect are in that 
way carried upon the group at the scene of the trouble, 
whether it is fighting, whether it is restoration of com-
munications whether it is relieving the encirclement of 
a city, the'evacuation of Japanese! or, as ~s ncm c~ming 
up, the demobilization reorganization, and integration of 
the armed forces in China. 
"We would have gotten nowhere without that head-
quarters. It is absolutely essential in every step of 
the way in connection with these agreements which have 
application to the military situation which of course 
includes coromunicati ons. 
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''Now the last evening I was in China, up to ten 
minutes before my departure, we were reaching agreements 
regarding sending these tea.ms into Manchuria. We reached 
a general agreement and they had certain details to work 
out after my departure. They should be on their way now. 
"It is of great importance that they get there as 
soon as possible. You must understand that it is exceed-
ingly difficult with the best intentions in the world to 
transmit orders where there are very limited radio com-
munications and almost no highway communications over 
these great forces are not well-knit organized units. I 
found it nec~ssary to make a trip of about J,500 miles 
to the principal region where there was still trouble. 
I was accompanied by the Government representative and 
part of his staff. 
"I found in the case of the latter, they hadn't 
seen some of the leaders, for t wo years and had very 
limited communications with them from time to time. 
We were able to resolve almost every difficulty once we 
got the people together. It was very remarkable how 
quickly we could straighten out what seemingly were im-
possible conditions and which had their tragic effect on 
the Chinese people. A single conference of a few hours 
in an afternoon would raise the encirclement of what 
amounted to ten or twenty beseiged cities where people 
were starving. It only took that long to straighten out 
but until we arrived nothing could be done. 
"Now in Manchuria they have no representative of 
the Executive Headquarters there up to this time. The 
situation has been very fluid, troops moving here and 
there and of course all sorts of minor clashes occurring. 
There is no doubt whatever in my mind in many instances, 
particularly on the communist side, that they are almost 
unaware of the agreement we have reached, therefore, it 
is most important that we have these tea.ms appear in that 
country as quickly as possible. 
"I would like to say the American officers in these 
small groups are rendering a very remarkable service not 
only under the difficult conditions of the task but under 
extremely difficult conditions of life. I repeat again 
that without the headquarters of the nature that we have 
established in Peiping with its representatives, it would 
be literally impossible to carry out any of these agree-
ments, even with the best intentions of the world at the 
top. 
"I saw General MacArthur in Japan and talked over 
with him the representation of Chinese troops in the army 
of occupation. He was very happy to have them and I think 
you will shortly read of an announcement by the General-
issimo to that effect." 
APPENDIX III 
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN 
ON UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD CHINA, 
DECEMBER 18, 1946 
Last December I made a statement of this Government's 
Views regarding China. We believed then and do now that a 
united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to 
world peace, that a broadening of the base of the National 
Government to make it representative of the Chinese people 
Will further China's progress toward this goal, and that 
~hina has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations 
to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as consti-
uting a threat to world stability and peace. It was made 
.Ac1lear at Moscow last year that these views are shared by our lies, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. On December 27th, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin issued a state-
ment which said in part: 
"The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with 
regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement 
as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the 
National Government for broad participation by democratic 
elements in all branches of the National Government, and for 
a cessation of civil strife. They affirllf3d their adherence 
to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs 
Of China." 
The policies of this Government were also made clear 
in my statement of last Decan.ber. We recognized the National 
Government of the Republic of China as the legal government. 
We undertook to assist the Chinese Government in reoccupation 
Of the liberated areas and in disarming and repatriating the 
Japanese invaders. And finally, as China moved toward peace 
ana. unity along the lines mentioned, we were prepared to 
assist the Chinese economically and in other ways. 
I asked General Marshall to go to China as my repre-
sentative. we had agreed upon my statement of tbe United 
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St!te~ Government's views and policies regarding China as 
hi~ directive. He knows full well in undertaking the mission 
that halting civil strife, broadening the base of the Chin-
ese Government and bringing about a united democratic China 
were.tasks for the Chinese themselves. He'went as a great 
Am~rican to make his outstanding a bilities available to the Chinese. 
During the war, the United States entered into an 
agreement with the Chine se Government regarding tre training 
and equipment of a special force of 39 divisions. That 
training ended V-J Day and the transfer of the equipment 
had been largely co mpleted when General Marshall arrived. 
The United S tates, the United Kingdom and the Union 
Of Soviet Socialist Republics all committed themselves to 
the liber ation of China, including the return of Manchuria 
to Chinese control. Our Government has agreed to assist the 
Chinese Government in the reoccupation of areas liberated 
from the Japanese, including Manchuria, because of China's 
lack of shipping and transport planes. Three armies were 
moved by air and eleven by sea, to central China, Formosa, 
north China and Manchuria. Most of these moves had been 
made or started when General Marshall arrived. 
The disarming and evacuation of Japanese progressed 
slowly- too slowly. We regarded our co.mm.itment to assist 
the Chinese in this program as of overwhelming L~portance 
to the future peace of China and the whole Far East. Sur-
rendered but undefeated Japanese armies and hordes of ad-
ministrators, technicians, and Japanese merchants, totalling 
a?out 3,000,000 persons, had to be removed unde~ the most 
difficult conditions. At the request of the Chinese Gov-
ernment we had retained a considerable number of American 
troops in China and immediately after V-J Day we landed 
a corps of Mari~es in north China. The principal task of 
these forces was to assist in the evacuation of Japanese. 
Only some 200,000 had been returned to Japan by the ti.me 
General Marshall arrived. 
General Marshall also faced a most unpropitious 
internal situation on his arrival in China. Communications 
throughout the country were badly disrupted due to destruc-
tion during the war and the civil conflicts which had brok-
en out since. This disrupting was preventing the.restor-
ation of Chinese economy the distribution of relief sup-
Plies and was rendering'the evacuation of Japanese a slow 
and difficult process. The wartime destruction of factories 
and plants, the war-induced inflation in China, the Japan-
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ese action in shutting down the economy of occupied China 
immediately after V-J Day, and finally the destruction 
of communications combined to paralyze the economy of the 
count:y, spreading untold hardship to millions, robbing 
the victory over the Japanese of significance to most 
Chinese and seriously aggravating all the tensions and 
discontents that existed in China. 
Progress toward solution of China's internal diff-
iculties by the Chinese themselves was essential to the 
rapid and effective completion of most of the programs in 
Which we had already pledged our assistance to the Chin-
ese Government. General Marshall's experience and wisdom 
were available to the Chinese in their efforts to reach 
such solutions. 
Events moved rapidly upon General Marshall's arrival. 
With all parties availing themselves of his impartial ad-
vice, agreement for a country-wide truce was reached and 
announced on January 10th. A feature of this agreement 
was the establishment of a unique organization, the Exec-
utive Headquarters in Peiping. It was realized that due 
to poor communications and the bitter feelings on local 
fronts, generalized orders to cease fire and withdraw might 
have little chance of being carried out unless some author-
itative executive agency, trusted by both sides, could fun-
ction in any local situation. 
The Headquarters operated under the leaders of three 
commissioners- one American who served as chairman, one 
Chinese Government representative, and one representative 
of the Chinese Co.m.r.nunist Party. Mr. Walters. Robertson, 
Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy in China, ser-
ved as chairman until his return to this country in the 
fall. In order to carry out its function in the field, 
Executive Headquarters formed a l arge number of t r uce teams, 
each headed by one American officer, one Chinese Government 
officer, and one Chinese Communist off icer. They proceeded 
to all danger spots where fighting was going on or seemed 
impending and saw to the implementation of tre truce terms, 
often under conditions imposing exceptional hardships and 
requiring courageous action. The degree of cooperation 
attained between Government and Communist officers in the 
Headquarters and on the truce teams was a welcome proof 
tha t despite two decades of fighting, these t wo Chinese 
groups could work together. 
Events moved forward with equal promise on the polit-
ical front. On January 10th, the Political Consultative 
Conference began its sessions with representatives of the 
Kuomintang or Government Party, the Communist Party, and 
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several minor political parties participating. Within 
three weeks of direct discussion these groups had come 
to a series of statesmanlike agreements on outstanding 
political and military problems. The agreements pro-
vided for an interim g overnment of a coalition type with 
representation of all parties , for revision of the Draft 
Constitution along democratic lines prior to its discus-
sion and adoption by a Nationa l Assembly and for reduc-
tion of the Government and uommunist armies and th e ir 
eventual amalgamation into a small modernized t r uly na-
tional army responsible to a civilian government. 
In March, General Marshall returned to this country. 
He reported on t he i mportant step the Chinese had made 
toward peace and unity in a rriving at the s e agreements. 
He also pointed out t hat these agreements could not be 
satisfactorily implemented and given substance unless 
China's economic disintegration were checked and partic-
ularly unless the transportaion system could be put in 
working order. Political unity could not be built on 
economic chaos. This Gover nment had already authorized 
certain minor cred its to the Chine s e Government in an 
effort to meet emergency rehabilitation needs as it was 
doing fo r other wa r devastated countries throughout the 
world. A total of approximately $66,000,000 was invol-
ved in six specific projects, chiefly for the p urchase 
of raw cotton, and for ships and railroad repair meterial. 
But these emergency measures were inade quate. Following 
the important forward step made by the Chine s e in the 
agreements as reported by General Marshall, the Export-
Import Bank earma rked a total of ~~ 500,000,000 for possible 
additional credits on a project by project basis to 
Chinese Government agencies and private ent erprises. Agree-
ments to ex tend actual credits for such projects would 
obviously have to be based upon this Government's policy 
as announced December 15, 1945. So far, this $ 500,000,000 
remains earmarked, but unexpended. 
While comprehensive large scale aid has been delayed, 
this Government has completed its wartime lend-lease com-
mitments to China. Lend-le ase assistance was ex tended to 
China to assist he r in fighting the Japanese, am l a ter 
to fulfill our promise to assist in reoccupying the country 
from the Japanese. Assistance took the form of goods and 
equipment and of services. Almo s t ha lf the tota l took the 
form of goods and equipment and of services. Almost half 
the total made available to China consisted of services, such 
as those involved in air and water transportation of troops. 
According to the latest figures reported, lend-lease assis-
tance to China up to V-J Day totalled approximately $ 870,000 , 
000. From V-J Day to the end of February, shortly after 
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General Marshall's arrival, the total was approximately 
600,000,000 - mostly in transportation costs. There-
after, the program was reduced to the fulfillment of out-
standing commitments, much of which was later suspended. 
A considerable quantity of civilian goods has also 
been made available by our agreement with China for the 
disposal of surplus property which enabled us to liquidate 
a sizable indebtedness and to dispose of large quantities 
of surplus material. During the war the Chinese Govern-
ment furnished Chinese currency to the United States 
Army for the use in building its installations, feeding 
the troops, and other expenses. By the end of the war 
this indebtedness amounted to something like 150,000, 
?00,000 Chinese dollars. Progressive currency inflation 
in China rendered it impossible to determine the exact 
value of the sum in United States currency. 
China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by 
the United States in China and on seventeen Pacific 
Islands and bases with certain exceptions. Six months of 
negotiations preceded the agreement finally signed in 
August. It was imperative that this matter be concluded 
in the Pacific as had already been done in Europe, espe-
cially in view of the rapid deterioration of the material 
in open stoarage under tropical conditions an::'i the urgent 
need of the partial alleviation of the acute economic 
distress of the Chinese people which it was hoped this 
transaction would permit. Aircraft, all non-demilitarized 
combat material, and fixed installations outside of China 
were excluded. Thus, no weapons which could be used in 
fighting a civil war were made available through this 
agreement. 
The Chinese Government cancelled all but 30,000,000 
United States dollars of our indebtedness for the Chinese 
currency, and promised to make available the equivalent of 
35,000,000 United States dollars for use in paying the 
United States governmental expenses in China and acquiring 
am improving buildings and pro pert ie s for our diploma tic 
and consular establishments. An additional sum of 20,000,000 
United States dollars is also designated for the fulfill-
ment of a cultural and educational program. 
Before General Marshall arrived in China for the 
second time in April, there was evidence that the truce 
agreement w~s being disregarded. The sincere and unflag-
ging efforts of Exec utive Headquarters and its truce teams 
have succeeded in ma y instances in preventing or ending 
local engagements and thus saved thousands of lives. But 
fresh outbreaks of civil strife continued to occur, reach-
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ing a crisis of violence in Manchuria with the capture of 
Changchun by the Communist s and where the presence of truce 
teams had not been fully agreed to by the National Govern-
ment. 
A change in the course of events in the political 
field was equally disappointing. Negotiations between 
the Government and the Communists have been reswned again 
and again, but they have as often broken down. Although 
hope for final success has never disappeared completely, 
t he agreements made in January and February have not been 
implemented, and the various Chinese groups have not since 
that time been able to achieve the degree of agreement 
reached at the Political Consultative Conference. 
There has been encouraging progress in other fields, 
particularly the elimination of Japanese from China. The 
Chinese Government was responsible under an Allied agree-
ment for the disarmament of all Japanese military person-
nel and for the repatriation of all Japanese civilians 
and military personnel from China, Formosa and French 
Indo-China north of the sixteenth degree of latitude. Our 
Government agreed to assist the Chinese in this task. The 
scope of the job was tremendous. There were about .3,000, 
000 Japanese, nearly one-half of them Army or Navy person-
nel to be evacuated. Water and rail transportation had 
been destroyed or was immobilized. Port facilities were 
badly damaged and overcrowded with relief and other supplies. 
The Japanese had to be disarmed, concentrated and then trans-
ported to the nearest available port. In some instances 
this involved long distances. At the ports they had to be 
individually searched and put through a health inspection. 
All had to be inoculated. Segregation camps had to be estab-
lished at the ports to cope with the incidence of epidemic 
diseases such as Asiatic cholera. Finally .3,000,000 persons 
had to be moved by ship to Japan. 
American forces helped in the disarmament of Japanese 
units. Executive Headquarters and its truce teams were 
able to make the complicated arrangements necessary to 
transfer Japanese across lines and through areas involved 
in civil conflict on their was to ports of embarkation. 
American units also participated in the inspections at the 
port, while American medical units supervised all inocula-
tion and the other medical work. Finally, American and 
Japanese ships under the control of General MacArthur in 
Japan, and a number of United States Navy ships under the 
Seventh Fleet transported this enormous number of persons 
to reception ports in Japan. 
At the end of last year, approximately 200,000 Jap-
anese had been repatriated. They were leaving Chinese 
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ports at a rate of about 2,500 a day. By March of this 
year, rapidly increased efforts on the part of the Amer-
ican forces and the Chinese authorities involved had 
increased this rate to more than 20,000 a day. By Novem-
ber, 2,986,438 Japanese had been evacuated and the pro-
gram was considered completed. Except for indeterminate 
numbers in certain parts of Manchuria, only war criminals 
and technicians retained on an emergency basis by the 
Chinese Government remain. That this tremendous under-
taking has been accomplished despite conflict, disrupted 
communications and other difficulties will remain an 
outstanding example of successful American-Chinese cooper-
ation toward a common goal. 
Much has been said of the presence of United States 
armed forces in China during the past year. Last fall 
these forces were relatively large. They had to be. No 
one could prophesy in advance how well the Japanese forces 
in China would observe the surrender terms. We had to 
provide forces adequate to as s ist the Chinese in the event 
of trouble. When it became obvious that the armed Japanese 
would not be a problem beyond the capabilities of the 
Chinese Armies to handle, rediployment was begun at once. 
The chief responsibility of our forces was that of 
assisting in evacuation of Japanese. This task was pro-
longed by local circumstances. Provision of American 
personnel for the Executive Headquarters and its truce 
teams has required a fairly large number of men, partic-
ularly since the all important network of radio and other 
communications was provided entirely by the United States. 
The Executive Headquarters i s located at Peiping, a hun-
dred miles from the sea and in an area where there was the 
possibility of local fighting. Hence, another responsi-
bility was to protect the line of supply to and from Head-
quarters. Another duty our forces undertook immediately 
upon the Japanese surrender was to provide the necessary 
protection so that coal from the great mines northeast of 
Tientsin could reach the sea for shipment to supply the 
cities and railroads of central China. This coal was 
essential to prevent the collapse of this industrial area. 
Our Marines were withdrawn from this duty last September. 
Other units of our forces were engaged in searching for 
the bodies or graves of American soldiers who had died 
fighting the Japanese in China. Still others were re-
quired to guard United States installations and stores of 
equipment, and to process these for return to this country 
or sale as surplus property. 
At peak strength a year ago we had some 113,000 
soldiers, sailors, and marines in China. Today this 
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number is being reduced to less than 12,000 including 
some 2,000 directly concerned with the opera tions of 
Executive Headquarters and will be further reduced to the 
number required to supply and secure the American person-
nel of Executive Headquarters and the air field and stores 
at Tsingtao . 
. Thus during the past year we have successfully 
assisted in the repatriation of the Japanese and have 
subsequently been able to bring most of our own troops 
home. We have afforded appropriate assistance in the 
reoccupation of the country from the Japanese. We have 
undertaken some emergency measures of economic assistance 
to prevent the collapse of China's economy and have li-
quidated our own wartime financial accout with China. 
It is a matter of deep regret that China has not 
yet been able to achieve unity by peaceful methods. Be-
cause he knows how serious the problem i s , and how impor-
tant it is to reach a solution, General Marshall has 
remained at his post even though active negotiations have 
been broken off by the Communist Party. We are r eady to 
help China as she moves toward peace and genuine democra-
tic government. 
The views expressed a year ago by this Government 
are valid today. The plan for political unification agreed 
to last February is sound. The plan for military unifi-
cation of last February has been made difficult of imple-
mentation by the progress of the fighting since last April, 
but the general principles involved are fundamentally sound. 
China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact 
and we recognize the National Government of China. We 
continue to hope that the Government will find a peaceful 
solution. We are pledged not to interfere in the internal 
~ffairs of China. Our position is clear. While avoiding 
involvement in their civil strife, we will persever with 
our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about 
peace and economic recovery in their country. 
As ways and means are presented for constructive 
aid to China we will give them careful and sympathetic 
consideratio~. An examole of suchaid is the recent agri-
cultural mission to China under Dean Hutchison of the Uni-
versity of California sent at the request of the Chinese 
Government. A joint Chinese-American Agricultural Colla-
boration Co.mm.ission was formed which included the Hutchi-
son mission. It spent four months studying rural problems. 
Its recommendations are now available to the Chinese Gov-
ernment and so also is any feasible aid we can give in 
impleme~ting those recommendations. When conditions in 
China improve we are prepared to consider aid in carrying 
out other projects, unrelated to civil strife, which would 
encourage economic reconstruction and reform in China and 
which, in so doing, would promote a general revival of 
commercial relations between American and Chinese 
businessmen. 
We believe that our hopes for China are identical 
with what the Chinese people themselves most earnestly 
desire. We shall therefore continue our positive and 
realistic policy toward China which is based on full 
respect for her national sovereignty and on our traditional 
friendship for the Chinese people and is designated to 
promote international peace. 
APPENDIX IV 
MARSHALL'S REPORT ON CHINA 
(Text of statement by General of the Army George 
C. Marshall, President Truman's Special Ambassador 
to China, on the situation in China, at Nanking, 
Jan. 7, 1947. The statement was made only a few 
hours before announcement of General Marshall' s 
appointment as U. s. Secretary of State.) 
The President has recently given a summary of the 
developments in China during the past year and the posi-
tion of the American Government toward China. Circwn-
stances nOJv dictate that I should supplement this with 
impressions gained at first hand. 
In this intricate and confused situation, I shall 
merely endeavor here to touch on some of the more impor-
tant considerations - as they appear to me - during my con-
nection with the negotiations to bring about peace in China 
and a stable democratic form of government. 
In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace 
has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with 
which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang 
regard each other. 
On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are 
strongly opposed to a Communistic form of government. On 
the other, the Communists frankly state that they are 
Marxists and intend to work toward establishment of a 
Communistic form of government in China, though first 
advancing through a mediwn of a democratic form of gov-
ernment of the American or British type. 
The leaders Of the Government are convinced in their 
minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate 
in the government of the type endorsed by the Political 
Consultative Conference last January had for its purpose 
only a destructive intention. The Communists felt, I 
believe, that the Government was insincere in its appar-
ent acceptance of the PCC resolution for the formation 
of the new government and intended by coercion of mill-
. ' ' 
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tary force and the action of secret police to obliterate 
the Communist Party. Combined with this mutual deep dis-
trust; was the suspicions of' the other party in estimati ng 
the reason for proposals or opposition regarding the set-
tlement of various matters under ne gotiation. They each 
sought only to take counsel of their own fears. They both, 
therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of 
each situation and were susceptible to every evil sugges-
tion or possibility. This complication was exaggreated 
to an explosive degree by the confused reports of fighting 
on the distant and tremendous fronts of hostile military 
contact. Patrol clashes were deliberately magnified into 
large offensive actions. The distortion of the facts was 
utilized by both sides to heap condemnation on the other. 
It was only through the reports of .American officers in 
the field, teams from Executive Headquarters, t.ba.t I could 
get even a pa rtial idea of what was actually happening and 
the incidents were too numerous and the distances too 
great for the American personnel to cover all oft.he ground. 
I must comment here on the superb courage of the officers 
of our Army and Marines in struggling agai ns t al mos t ins ur-
mo unta ble and maddening obstacles to bring some measure of 
peace of China. 
I think the most important factos involved in the 
recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side 
of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomin-
tang Party, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who 
have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort 
I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalit-
ion government. This has usually been under the cover of 
political or party ac tion, but since the party was the 
Government, this action, though subtle or indirect, has been 
devastating in its effect. They were quite frank in pub-
licly stating their belief that cooperation by the Chinese 
Communist Party in the Government was inconceivable and that 
only a policy of force would definitely settle the issue. 
This group includes military as well as political leaders. 
On the side of the Chinese Communist Party, there are, 
I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view 
is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese 
Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit 
of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has 
appeared to me that there ls a definite liberal group among 
the Communists, especially of young men who have turned 
to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident 
in the local governments - men who would put the interest 
of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish 
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a Communist ideology in the immediate future. The 
dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most 
drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the 
destruction of communications in order to wreck the econ-
omy of China and produce a situa tion that would facili-
tate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without 
any regard to the immediate suffering of the people invol-
ved. They comple tely distrust the leaders of the Kuomin-
tang Party and appear convinced that every Government 
proposal is designated to crush the Chinese Communist 
Party. I must say that the quite evidently inspired mob 
actions of l ast February and March, so.me within a few 
blocks of where I was then engaged in completing negoti-
ations, gave the Communists good excuse for such suspic-
ions. 
However, a very harmful and immensely provocative 
phase of the Chinese Communist Party procedure has been 
in the character of its propaganda. I wish to state to 
the .American people that, in the deliberate misrepresen-
tation and abuse of tre action, policies and purposes of 
our Government, this propaganda has been without regard for 
the truth, without any regard whatsoever for the facts, 
and has given plain evidence of the determined purpose to 
mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse a 
bitter hatred of Americans. It has been difficult to 
remain silent in the midst of such public a buse and whole-
sale disregard of facts, but a denial would merely lead 
to the dally necessity of denials; an intolerable course 
of action for an American official. In t he interest of 
fairness, I must state that the Nationalist Government 
publicity agency has made numerous misrepresentations, 
though not of the vicious nature of the Communist propa-
ganda. Incidentially, the Communist statements regarding 
the Anping incident which resulted in the death of three 
marines and wounding of 12 others were almost pure fab-
rication, deliberately representing a carefully arranged 
ambuscade of a marine convoy with supplies for the main-
tenance of Executive Headquarters and so:roo UNNRA supplies, 
as a defense against a marine assault. The inves tiga tion 
of this incident was a tortuous procedure of delays and 
maneuvers to disguise the true and private ly admitted facts 
of the case. 
Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been 
frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both 
sides. The agreement reached by the Political Consulta-
tive Conference a year ago was a liberal and forward-
looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace 
and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups 
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within the Kuomintang Party, interested in the preser-
vation of their own feudal control of China evidently 
had no real intention of implementing them.' Though r 
speak as a soldier, I must here also deplore the domin-
ating influence of the military. Their dominance accen-
tuates the _weakness of civil government in China. At 
the same time, in pondering the situation in China one 
must have clearly in mind not the workings of smali 
Communist groups or committees to which we are accustomed 
in America, but rather of millions of people and an army 
of more than 1,000,000 men. 
I have never been in a position to be certain of 
the development of attitudes in the innermost Chinese 
Communist circles. Most certainly, the course which 
the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months 
indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It 
has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a 
conference table with Government representatives to discuss 
given issues. Now the Communists have broken off nego-
tiations by their last officer which demanded the dis-
solution of the National Assembly and a return to the 
military positions of January 13 which the Government 
could not be expected to accept. 
Between this cominant reactionary group in the 
Government and the irreconcilable Communists who, I must 
state, did not so appear last February, lies the problem 
of hem peace and well being are to be brought to the 
longsuffering and presently inarticulate mass of the 
people of China. The reactionaries in the Government 
have evidently counted on substantial American support 
regardless of their actions. The Communists by their 
unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are 
evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring abollt 
the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive 
guerrilla action against the long lines of rail commun-
ications - regardless of the cost in suffering to the 
Chinese people. 
The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would 
be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the 
Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group 
of men but who as yet lack the political power to exer-
cise a'controlling influence. Successful action on their 
part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chaing Kai-shek 
would, I believe, lead to unity through good government. 
In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a demo-
cratic Constitution which in all major respects is accor-
dance with the principles laid down by the all-party 
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Political Consultative Conference of last January. It 
is unfortunate tha t the Communists did not see fit to 
participate in the Assembly since the Constitution that 
has been adop ted seems to include every major point they 
wanted. 
Soon the Government in China will undergo major 
reorganization pending the coming into force of the 
Constitution following elections to be completed before 
Christmas Day 1947. Now tha t the form for a democratic 
China has been laid down by the newly adopted Cons ti tu-
tion, practical measures will be the test. It remains 
to be seen to what extent the Government will give sub-
stance to the form by a genuine welcome of all groups 
actively to share in the responsibility of Government. 
The first step will be the reorganization of the 
State Council and the Executive Branch of Government to 
carry on administration pending the enforcement of the 
Constitution. The manner in which this is done and the 
amount of representation accorded to liberals and to 
non-Kuomintang members will be significant. It is also 
to be hoped that during this interim period the door 
will remain open for Communists or other groups to par-
ticipate if they see fit to assume their share of respon-
sibility for the future of China. 
It has been stated officially and categorically that 
the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang is 
at an end. If the termination of one-party rule is to be 
a reality, the Kuomintang should cease to recieve financial 
support from the Government. 
I have spoken very frankly because in no other way 
can I hope to bring the people of the u. s. to even a 
partial understanding of this complex problem. I have 
expressed all these views privately in the course of 
negotiations; they are well known, I think, to most of the 
individuals concerned. I express them now publicly, as 
it is my duty, to present my estimate of the situation am 
its possibilities to the American people who have a deep 
interest in the development of conditions in the Far East 
promising an enduring peace in the Pacific. 
Map 
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